Wednesday, October 31, 2012

FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWERS IN MARYLAND AND WASHINGTON, D.C.: A Primer by Whistleblower Attorney Charles Jerome Ware (PART I)

The national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, specializes in the protection of whistleblowers and their careers. We are: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

We believe that no employee should be punished for doing the right thing, and in particular those employees who have the courage and integrity to blow the whistle on corporate fraud, waste, and other unlawful actions. The U.S. Congress has enacted several laws that provide whistleblowers with protection from employer retaliation as well as monetary rewards for their service.

The national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, is well-experienced in protecting whistleblowers.

You may have a claim as a Whistleblower if:
  • You have uncovered illegal or unethical activity by your employer that you wish to report.
  • Your employer is retaliating against you, or has retaliated against you, for reporting fraud or wrongdoing.
  • You have reported, or you wish to report, the bribery of foreign government officials by U.S. companies or individuals.
  • Your employer has engaged in, or is engaging in, fraudulent practices undermining the U.S. government such as double-billing, overcharging, or improper billing or coding.
  • You need to protect your career because you have reported your employer's illegal or unethical conduct.
  • Your reputation and/or financial stability is on the line because you did the right thing and spoke out about illegal or unethical activity.
Our attorneys have represented several individuals successfully in whistleblower claims, including:
  • In-house counsel, chief financial officers and other executives,
  • Doctors, nurses, Medicare billing specialists, accountants, and other employees of healthcare providers,
  • Employees of government contractors who blow the whistle on employers who defraud the government
  • Federal employees opposing fraud, waste, and abuse
Be aware that in the Maryland and Washington, D.C. area, as well as throughout the United States, there are a number of whistleblower laws enacted to protect you: whether you have experienced employer retaliation because you have done the right thing and spoken out when your employer violated the law or acted unethically; or, even, whether you simply have information but are afraid to speak out.

Some Whistleblower (or Retaliation) Statutes:

The decision for an employee to step up and blow the whistle on his employer, etc., can many times be a difficult one to make. We are here to help you make that decision. Some of the many laws available to protect the right of bona fide whistleblowers include:

  • Maryland Whistleblower Act, SPP 5-201, et seq.:. This law prohibits retaliation leveled against an employee who reports abuses of employer power, safety violations, or gross mismanagement of money.
  • Maryland False Health Care Claims Act (MD FCA). The MD FCA is similar to the Federal False Claims Act and authorizes the state government to reward whistleblowers who report attempts to defraud a Maryland state health plan or program. The law also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report the fraud or participate in a government investigation.
  • Federal False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA authorizes the federal government to reward whistleblowers who report information regarding fraud committed by contractors against the federal government. Additionally, the law prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report the fraud or participate in the government’s investigation.
  • Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. SOX prohibits corporations from retaliating against employees who report fraud committed against the shareholders. Examples of protected conduct include reporting an employer’s improper entries on financial statements, raising a concern about a supervisor’s practice of backdating letters of credit, or reporting any other practices that the whistleblower reasonably believes would mislead shareholders.
  • Dodd-Frank Act (DFA). The DFA establishes three new whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions.
  • SEC Whistleblower. The SEC must reward whistleblowers who report corporate fraud exceeding $1 million. The law prohibits employers from retaliating against whistleblowers.
  • Commodity Futures, Options, and Derivatives CFTC Whistleblower. The CFTC must reward whistleblowers who report the illegal manipulation of derivatives and options. The law prohibits employers from retaliating against whistleblowers.
  • Financial Services Whistleblower. The law prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report fraud related to a financial product or service, i.e., mortgages, credit cards, financial advice, etc....
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)
29 C.F.R. Part 1640
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
Clayton Act (antitrust)15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
Clean Air Act42 U.S.C. § 7622
29 C.F.R. Part 24
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“Super Fund”)42 U.S.C. § 9610
29 C.F.R. Part 24
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), 1140
Energy Reorganization Act 42 U.S.C. § 5851
29 C.F.R. Part 24
Equal Pay Act29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
Fair Labor Standards Act (wage & hour, child labor, minimum wage, overtime)29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
29 C.F.R. Part 783
False Claims Act31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)
Family and Medical Leave Act [“FMLA"]29 U.S.C. § 2615
National Labor Relations Act29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)
Occupational Safety and Health Act29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
29 C.F.R. Part 1977
(“Part 11(c)”)
Safe Drinking Water Act42 U.S.C. § 300j-9
Sarbanes Oxley Act18 U.S.C. § 1514A
Solid Waste Disposal Act42 U.S.C. § 6971
29 C.F.R. Part 24
Toxic Substances
Control Act
15 U.S.C. § 2622
29 C.F.R. Part 24

[www.whistleblowerlaws.com/ Whistlerblower Protections Act; www.ehow.com/ Whistlerblower Protection Act of 2009; www.bizjournals.com/Baltimore/ Fale Medicaid Claims; www.falseclaimsact.com; www.justice.gov/ False Claims Cases; "Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers", 3 William & Mary Policy Review 184 (2012); Joel Hesh, Whistleblowing: A Guide To Government Reward Programs, Goshen Press (2009)]

Monday, October 29, 2012

WRONGFUL DEATH IN MARYLAND: A Primer by Maryland Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

The attorneys at the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., regret hearing about the wrongful death of anyone, but we are here for you and your loved ones when you have a wrongful death claim.

We recognize and understand the tremendous agony and emotional strain you are experiencing in this process, and we want to help you in any way possible to survive it.

Survival Actions and Wrongful Death Actions In Maryland

When a victim dies in an accident or from medical malpractice in Maryland, the deceased person's family may typically file two separate claims: a "survival action" and a "wrongful death" action.

The "survival action" is an action brought on behalf of the personal representative for the estate of the deceased, claiming recovery for the injuries suffered by the victim. Maryland law allows compensation to the deceased victim's estate for the pain and suffering and other damages, and actual expenses incurred by the victim that were suffered up to the moment of death.

The "wrongful death action" is brought by the relatives of the victim and it seeks compensation for the victim's accidental death.

In a survival action in Maryland, damages are measured in terms of harm to the actual. victim. The personal representative serves as the posthumous agent of the victim. In a wrongful death action in Maryland, damages are measured in terms of harm to loved ones as a result of the loss of the victim. In this case, the surviving relatives do not serve the agent for the decedent and act on their own behalf for their own loss.

One chief difference between a survival statute and a wrongful death statute is that if death is instantaneous, there can be no cause of action except for medical bills and funeral expenses under the Maryland survival statute. Of course, this is a fallacy of law; no one can argue that a parent who does not get to see their children grow up has not suffered a loss. But the law gives that claim to the children under the survival statute.

Statutes of Limitations

Any medical malpractice action must be filed either within five years from the date when the injury was committed or three years from the date when the injury was discovered, whichever is earlier [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-109 (1995)]. Against a minor, the statute does not begin to run until a claimant has reached the age of eleven, and if the action involves a foreign object or injury to the reproductive system, the statute does not begin to run until the claimant is sixteen. Id. Maryland’s highest court has held that the five-year part of the statute is not measured from the date treatment ends and does not violate the state constitution [Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985)].

A wrongful death action brought by the decedent’s dependents must be filed within three years after death [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 (1995)]. This statute applies to a wrongful death action brought on a medical malpractice theory, while § 5-109 applies to a survival action brought by the decedent’s estate.[Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988)].

Some Wrongful Death Awards

- $3,000,000 Jury Award for Maryland pedestrian death.
- $1,300,000 Award. Wrongful death caused by hypertensive stroke during pregnancy (preeclampsia and eclampsia) arising from physician and nursing negligence in the hospital.
- $2,000,000 Award for Road Rage Wrongful Death [Attorney for Plaintiffs: Charles Jerome Ware]
- $1,125,000 Award for wrongful death resulting from failure to treat deep vein thrombosis (DVT), pulmonary embolus (PE) and negligent discharge from the hospital.
- $1,100,000.00 Award for wrongful death caused by negligent insertion of a chest tube in the emergency room.

[www.millerandzois.com/Wrongful Death, Survival Actions; www.mcandl.com/ Maryland Medical Malpractice; Understanding the Law: A Primer, by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware, iUniverse Publishers; voices.washingtonpost.com/crim-scene/ $3 Million Jury Award/ 03-11-2011]

Friday, October 26, 2012

LAW UPDATE: BAD DRUGS, "OLD MAN?" AND "BOW WOW" (the Rapper, not the Dog)

BAD DRUGS

Consistent with the mushrooming increase of pharmaceutical (drug) advertising in the media, it is not surprising that so-called "adverse drug events" are on the rise.

The Institute for Safe Medication Practices, an independent watch dog group is reporting a 23.8% increase in the number of reports of serious adverse (negative) events associated with the use of various medications during the first quarter of 2012 as compared to the same time period in 2011. The 57,393 adverse drug events represented a 30% increase over the number reported in the first quarter of 2011 (40,176).

The Institutes's Report, known as "Quarter Watch", relies primarily on data received from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The Report covering the first quarter of 2012 said that the numbers are part of a "sustained and substantial growth" in adverse event reports associated with new and existing drugs.

The Report focused on four drugs - Takeda's Actos for diabetes, Eli Lilly's Cymbalta for depression, Novartis' Tekturna for high blood pressure, and Janssen's Xarelto, an anti-coagulant.

"No Room For Old Men?"

A 70-year-old Maryland man will receive $235,000 for his wrongful termination from his jobs as town administrator and finance director for Elkton, Maryland. The man filed his complaint with the Baltimore office of the U.S. Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging age discrimination. The case was settled through the EEOC.

"Bow Wow (the rapper, not the dog) is not dead": Client Update

Star rapper Bow Wow was rumored in a fake and false "CNN website" to be dead.

In fact, the young, successful rapper and actor named Shad Gregory Moss, born in Columbus, Ohio, is doing very well with his hip hop career.

Being in the music and acting business can be enormously stressful, and especially for an artist in the hip hop genre who has been involved since he was just a 13-year-old child and is now only 25 years of age.

[Lawyers USA, dailyalert_USA@lawyersweekly.com/ "Watchdog Group: Adverse Drug Events Increase"; www.charged.fm/blog/ "Bow Wow's Fake Death"; thedailyrecord.com/Maryland; "Bow Wow", YouTube, 04-13-2009 (Retrieved 03-28-2012)]

SOUTH CAROLINA: "A 'GASP' BY FAKE DOCTOR AT 'AGAPE'"

Most criminals who steal identities do so for the immediate purpose of fraudulently acquiring products and/or cash using the victim's identity.

However, many criminals go a step further.

Take Ernest Addo, age 48, of Austell, Georgia for example. Addo was arrested and charged recently for stealing the identity of his "best friend", a doctor, and posing as a doctor at the AGAPE Senior Primary Care Center in Orangeburg, South Carolina.

Further, Addo got away with his scheme for over 6 months and treated up to 500 patients at the Center.

Needless to say, we are a 'gasp' at the actions and audacity of Ernest Addo at 'Agape'.

[thegrio.com/ 08-27-2012/ "Fake Doctor Who Treated 500 Patients Arrested In Georgia"; touchfm.org/ 08-27-2012/ Fake-Doctor]

Thursday, October 25, 2012

FAKE BANKRUPTCY LAWYER IN BALTIMORE

Michael Mancini is a high school graduate who apparently did not believe he needed to attend college, finish law school and pass the bar exam in order to practice law in Baltimore City, Maryland.

He was wrong.

A bankruptcy court judge in Baltimore this week ordered the closure of Mancini's "law firm", Scalia & Seidel, issued a cease and desist order blocking him from conducting legal business, and ordered him to pay $261,000 in fines for "representing clients in bankruptcy cases".

[thedailyrecord.com/ 2012-10-24/ "Judge Shuts Down Fake Baltimore Law Firm"; www.law.com/jsp/law/ 10-25-2012/ "Judge Shuts Phony Law Firm Run By Attorney-Poser"]

BREAKINGS NEWS!!!: ANOTHER WHISTLEBLOWER STEPS UP --- BANK OF AMERICA (BOA) SUED FOR $1 BILLION MORTGAGE "HUSTLE"

A report from the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

The U.S. Justice Department has just filed a $1 billion civil lawsuit against Bank of America (BOA), alleging that one of its subsidiaries (so to speak), COUNTRYWIDE Mortgage, ran a "brazen" loan-origination mortgage fraud program called "The Hustle". The program allegedly tried to speed up the process of approving loans and selling them off to Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association).

BOA's (Countrywide's) "Hustle" program, short for "High Speed Swim Lane", eliminated many underwriting reviews even on high-risk loans, cut compliance checks and balances, and brazenly compensated employees solely on volume of mortgage loans and not quality of the loans. Further, the Justice Department's civil complaint alleges, when early signs began showing that many of the loans were rapidly going into default status, BOA (Countrywide) callously ignored the warning signs and did not let Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac know what the bank saw coming with the mushrooming red flags of financial disaster.

It should be noted that this first civil fraud lawsuit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice over mortgage loans sold to Fannie and Freddie and other big mortgage financiers bailed out in 2008 was originally filed by a WHISTLEBLOWER.

We expect other civil fraud suits to be filed against the mortgage industry for selling millions of toxic loans to Fannie and Freddie.

[www.businessweek.com/article/ 2012/10/25/ "The Surprises in the $1 Billion Bank Suit"; uk.reuters.com/article/ 2012-10-25/ "U.S. Sues Bank of America over "Hustle" Mortgage Fraud"; money.cnn.com/ 2012-10-24/ "Bank of America Sue For Alleged Mortgage Fraud"]

MILLION DOLLAR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AWARDS: An Update

This update is brought to you by the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still committed. Still working. Still here to make a difference."

$4,300,000.00 SURGERY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AWARD FOR LACERATED AORTA DURING BARIATRIC SURGERY
_________________________________________________________________________

In this surgery medical malpractice matter, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant surgeon was negligent during bariatric surgery (weight-loss surgery) in lacerating the plaintiff's aorta (the largest artery in the body) resulting in massive blood loss and cardiac arrest (heart attack).

The plaintiff, age 62, suffered as a result profound hypotension (low blood pressure) which resulted in kidney failure, thus requiring the plaintiff undergo a kidney transplant. The plaintiff also suffered severe cognitive defects (mental retardation). --- Massachusetts case.
$3,000,000.00 CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - HOSPITAL NEGLIGENCE - FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE AND TIMELY TREAT FATAL SEPSIS FOLLOWING KNEE SURGERY; WRONGFUL DEATH OF 70-YEAR-OLD WOMAN
_________________________________________________________________________

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff's estate alleged that the defendant medical facility was negligent in its treatment of the plaintiff's decedent during post-operative care and treatment. The decedent died of sepsis (severe response to bacteria or other germs to the body) following knee surgery.

The defendant denied the allegations and disputed the plaintiff’s injuries, causation and damages.

The 70-year-old female plaintiff suffered from gastric ulcers and came under the care of the defendant medical facility for a total knee replacement. Following the surgery, the plaintiff’s decedent complained of persistent abdominal pain. The decedent continued to experience abdominal pain, and an abnormal pulse rate and blood pressure readings, as well as decreased renal function in the 36-hour period following the surgery. The decedent had a surgical consult when a chest X-ray showed free air in the decedent’s abdomen.

The decedent was operated on again, which disclosed stomach wall perforations. She was then treated in the intensive care unit for sepsis and gastrointestinal complications.

The plaintiff died approximately one month later from septic complications.

The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant alleging negligence. The plaintiff contended that had the defendant recognized the signs of internal bleeding and sepsis immediately they could have appropriately treated the decedent.

The parties mediated the plaintiff’s claim and arrived at a confidential settlement of $3,000,000.00 to resolve the case. --- Massachusetts case.

[www.medicine.net.com; www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/hypotension; www.mayoclinic.com; www.jvra.com/verdict; www.emedicinehealth.com/cognitivedefects; www.webmd.com/hypotension/arota/cardiacarrest]

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

WHISTLEBLOWER PAYDAYS INCREASE: $104,000,000.00 AND COUNTING!

This information update is sponsored by the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

"Whistleblowing" --- i.e., the disclosure by a person, usually an employee in a government agency or private enterprise, to the public or to those in authority, of mismanagement, corruption, illegality, or some other wrongdoing --- is the new big money-maker for some employees.

Since the 1960s, the public value of whistle-blowing has been increasingly recognized. For example, federal and state statutes and regulations have been enacted to protect whistleblowers from various forms of retaliation. Even without a statute, numerous decisions encourage and protect whistleblowing on grounds of public policy. In addition, the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C.A. § 3729) will reward a whistleblower who brings a lawsuit against a company that makes a false claim or commits Fraud against the government.

Persons who act as whistleblowers are often the subject of retaliation by their employers. Typically the employer will discharge the whistleblower, who is often an at-will employee. An at-will employee is a person without a specific term of employment. The employee may quit at any time and the employer has the right to fire the employee without having to cite a reason. However, courts and legislatures have created exceptions for whistleblowers who are at-will employees.

Whistleblowing statutes protect from discharge or discrimination an employee who has initiated an investigation of an employer's activities or who has otherwise cooperated with a regulatory agency in carrying out an inquiry or the enforcement of regulations. Federal whistle-blower legislation includes a statute protecting all government employees, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2302(b)(8), 2302(b)(9). In the federal civil service, the government is prohibited from taking, or threatening to take, any personnel action against an employee because the employee disclosed information that he or she reasonably believed showed a violation of law, gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public safety or health. In order to prevail on a claim, a federal employee must show that a protected disclosure was made, that the accused official knew of the disclosure, that retaliation resulted, and that there was a genuine connection between the retaliation and the employee's action.

Former UBS Bankers Gets $104,000,000.00 From the IRS For Whistleblowing

After serving two and a half years in federal prison, former UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland) banker and whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld has now received an award of $104,000,000.00 from the IRS (Internal Revenue Service).

The award comes because of Birkenfeld's insider information to IRS revealing how thousands of rich Americans were hiding their money in Swiss banks (such as UBS) to avoid U.S. taxes.

Former Glaxo Smith Kline Quality Assurance Manager Files U.S. False Claims Act Case And Is Awarded At Least $96,000,000.00 For Whistleblowing
________________________________________________________________

Cheryl Eckard was terminated from her job as a Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK) Quality Assurance Manager in 2003 allegedly for "redundancy" related to the merger of GSK and SmithKline Beechan PLC. In reality, though, Ms. Eckard was terminated for complaining to her supervisors about her concerns over serious deficiencies in a GSK manufacturing plant in Puerto Rico. In July 2012, Ms. Eckard was rewarded with $96 million for her whistleblowing activities.

[legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/"Whistleblowing"; "Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act", by Elletta Sangrey Callahan and Terry Morehead, Villanova Law Review 37 (1992); Whistleblowing: A Federal Employee's Guide to Charges, Procedures, and Penalties, Federal Employees News Digest/ Reston, Virginia (2000); False Claims Act: Whistleblower Litigation, by James B. Helmer, Lexis/Nexis, 3rd ed. (2002); "The Year of the Whistle-Blowers", by James Kelly, Time (December 30, 2002); articles.nydailynews.com/ 2012-09-12/news/bradley-birkenfeld; www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-16/ "Whistleblower Wins $118 Million in Bank Accord"; abcnews.go.com/Business/biggest-whistleblower-rewards/story; online.wsj.com/article/ October 28, 2010/ "Whistleblower's Long Journey"]

Monday, October 22, 2012

Friday, October 19, 2012

HEART ATTACK MISDIAGNOSIS: NEW YORK JURY AWARDS $126,600,000.00

The national law office of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, is headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland, and is: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

Background

Each year about 5 million people in the United States visit emergency rooms with heart attack symptoms, including chest pains. Since heart attack symptoms are similar to a number of common on-life threatening conditions, physicians may fail to realize the severity of the patient's situation and may even misdiagnose the patient's medical condition.

Three (3) of the more common mistakes made during the diagnosis of a heart attack include:

(1) Relying on a regular ECG to gauge the presence or lack of a heart attack. Some studies have shown that a significant number of misdiagnosed heart attacks occur due to improper reading of a patient's ECG.

(2) Many younger patients suffer heart attacks that remain undiagnosed.

(3) At least 2% of heart attacks may be incorrectly diagnosed by medical professionals. And, women may be at least seven or eight times more likely to have their heart attack misdiagnosed than men.

New York Jury Awards $126,600,000.00 for failure by medical staff to diagnose heart attack:

A New York woman who claims she sat unattended in a New York hospital for hours while medical personnel negligently failed to diagnose her heart attack has won a $126.6 million jury verdict.

The woman, an office manager and former horse trainer, claimed she suffered permanent injuries after the medical staff of the Hospital failed to recognize she was having a heart attack.

"In a nutshell, the jury didn't believe the hospital's expert, and awarded her damages for pain and suffering and her tremendous future medical expenses," said the woman's malpractice attorney.

[see, New England Journal of Medicine/ "Heart Attack Misdiagnosis"; Lawyersusaonline.com/ 10/18/2012; dailyalert_USA@lawyersweekly.com/ 10-18-2012/ "Jury Awards $126.6 Million For Failure To Diagnose Heart Attack"]

Thursday, October 18, 2012

RECORD DISMISSAL OF 6,732 DEBT COLLECTION CASES BY MARYLAND STATE DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE

Provided by the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

"Telephone-Gate": Joan Pratt and Peter Angelos versus Stephanie Rawlings-Blake

The Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos is representing Baltimore Comptroller Joan M. Pratt without charge (pro bono) in her civil suit against Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and the City Council of Baltimore seeking to stop Baltimore City from moving forward with a controversial new telephone system because of a lack of competitive bidding.

[Joan M. Pratt, et al. vs. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, Civil Case Number 24C12006018, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case filed 10/12/2012]

6732 Debt Collection Cases Dismissed

Chief Judge Ben C. Clyburn of the District Court of Maryland has dismissed 6,732 debt collection cases against Maryland residents within the past four months.

On July 10, 2012, Chief Judge Clyburn ordered the dismissal of 3,564 of the debt collection cases after a settlement agreement was entered with the debt collection agencies LVNV and Resurgent Capital Services.

As part of the agreement reached with the Maryland State Collection Agency Licensing Board, LVNV and Resurgent will pay $1 million to the state and agreed to the dismissal of cases pending in Maryland District Court. Also, $3.8 million in credit will be applied to the accounts of 6,246 consumers whose cases have been adjudicated or settled. The settlement came after claims that LVNV and Resurgent violated state and federal laws about licensure and submitting false or misleading claims or affidavits in court.

On October 10th, 2012, Chief Judge Clyburn dismissed 3,168 debt collection cases against Maryland residents.

Judge Clyburn's order follows a settlement and final order in a federal class action against Worldwide Asset Purchasing and its affiliates issued by U.S. District Court Judge Richard D. Bennett. In that case, it was alleged that Worldwide Asset Purchasing and its affiliates were not properly registered or licensed, misstated amounts owed and improperly stated Social Security numbers in state court filings, and filed collection lawsuits after the statute of limitations had expired.

Judge Clyburn dismissed the 6,732 cases with prejudice, which means they cannot be re-filed. The order also states that judgments in the cases are marked as "satisfied" and judgment liens are released.

LVNV, Resurgent Capital Services, and Worldwide Asset Purchasing are part of a new industry called "debt buying", that has clogged the dockets of small claims courts in Maryland and throughout the country, particularly during the current recession. Debt buyers specialize in buying debts that have been abandoned by the original creditors, usually credit card companies, for a tiny fraction of the amount owed. Debts may be sold to other debt buyers several times, and the documentation to prove the debt is owed sometimes is little more than the person’s name, last known address and Social Security number.

Defendants whose cases have been dismissed will receive written notification from the District Court of Maryland. To get more information, Maryland residents should contact the local District Court location where the debt collection case was filed. In addition to sending written notices to the people affected by this order, the District Court is directing that court records and the Judiciary Case Search public records website be updated to show the dismissals. The records should be updated within the next month.

[see, Winemiller, et al. v. Worldwide Asset Purchasing, et al, Civil Case No. 1:09-CV-02487-RDB, U.S. Dist. Court-Maryland; www.bizjournals.com/ 10-12-2012; www.courts.state.md.us/press/2012/pr20121011.html; www.courts.state.md.us/press/2012/pr.20120711.html]

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

MARYLAND LEGAL UPDATES: "TELEPHONE GATE" --- Pratt and Angelos versus Rawlings-Blake; 6732 Debt Collection Cases Dismissed

Provided by the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

"Telephone-Gate": Joan Pratt and Peter Angelos versus Stephanie Rawlings-Blake

The Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos is representing Baltimore Comptroller Joan M. Pratt without charge (pro bono) in her civil suit against Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and the City Council of Baltimore seeking to stop Baltimore City from moving forward with a controversial new telephone system because of a lack of competitive bidding.

[Joan M. Pratt, et al. vs. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, Civil Case Number 24C12006018, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case filed 10/12/2012]

6732 Debt Collection Cases Dismissed

Chief Judge Ben C. Clyburn of the District Court of Maryland has dismissed 6,732 debt collection cases against Maryland residents within the past four months.

On July 10, 2012, Chief Judge Clyburn ordered the dismissal of 3,564 of the debt collection cases after a settlement agreement was entered with the debt collection agencies LVNV and Resurgent Capital Services.

As part of the agreement reached with the Maryland State Collection Agency Licensing Board, LVNV and Resurgent will pay $1 million to the state and agreed to the dismissal of cases pending in Maryland District Court. Also, $3.8 million in credit will be applied to the accounts of 6,246 consumers whose cases have been adjudicated or settled. The settlement came after claims that LVNV and Resurgent violated state and federal laws about licensure and submitting false or misleading claims or affidavits in court.
On October 10th, 2012, Chief Judge Clyburn dismissed 3,168 debt collection cases against Maryland residents.

Judge Clyburn's order follows a settlement and final order in a federal class action against Worldwide Asset Purchasing and its affiliates issued by U.S. District Court Judge Richard D. Bennett. In that case, it was alleged that Worldwide Asset Purchasing and its affiliates were not properly registered or licensed, misstated amounts owed and improperly stated Social Security numbers in state court filings, and filed collection lawsuits after the statute of limitations had expired.

Judge Clyburn dismissed the 6,732 cases with prejudice, which means they cannot be re-filed. The order also states that judgments in the cases are marked as "satisfied" and judgment liens are released.

LVNV, Resurgent Capital Services, and Worldwide Asset Purchasing are part of a new industry called "debt buying", that has clogged the dockets of small claims courts in Maryland and throughout the country, particularly during the current recession. Debt buyers specialize in buying debts that have been abandoned by the original creditors, usually credit card companies, for a tiny fraction of the amount owed. Debts may be sold to other debt buyers several times, and the documentation to prove the debt is owed sometimes is little more than the person’s name, last known address and Social Security number.
Defendants whose cases have been dismissed will receive written notification from the District Court of Maryland. To get more information, Maryland residents should contact the local District Court location where the debt collection case was filed. In addition to sending written notices to the people affected by this order, the District Court is directing that court records and the Judiciary Case Search public records website be updated to show the dismissals. The records should be updated within the next month.

[see, Winemiller, et al. v. Worldwide Asset Purchasing, et al, Civil Case No. 1:09-CV-02487-RDB, U.S. Dist. Court-Maryland; www.courts.state.md.us/press/2012/pr20121011.html; www.courts.state.md.us/press/2012/pr.20120711.html]

Tuesday, October 16, 2012

MARYLAND LEGAL UPDATES: HOWARD COUNTY SCHOOLS, PIT BULLS

Provided by the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."

"Pit Bull" Lawsuit

Joseph Weigel, a resident at Baltimore's low-income Armistead Gardens housing development has filed a civil lawsuit in the U.S. District Court asking the federal court to strike down a recent decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals (Maryland's highest state court) that pit bull dogs are "inherently dangerous".

Weigel argues that the ruling is unconstitutional and forces him and others at Armistead Gardens into eviction.

Defendants in the lawsuit now include, inter alia, the Chief Judge as well as the Court of Appeals, the Governor of the State, and the Attorney General for the State.

Howard County Schools

In a trend towards the increase use of outside legal counsel, the Howard County (Maryland) Public School System has announced the elimination of its in-house legal department. The school system says this decision will save it at least $200,000 in initial estimated costs for the coming year.

The decision was announced by the school system's new superintendent, Renee A. Foose, to the Howard County Board of Education. Foose says the elimination of the school's in-house legal department is part of her plan to restructure the school system's organization during her first 90 days on the job.

[Maryland Daily Record, October 16, 2012; thedailyrecord.com/2012/10/16]

Monday, October 15, 2012

"SCOTUS" UPDATE (SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES): NOVEMBER 2012 SITTING

This blog featuring the activities and work of the Supreme Court of the United States ("SCOTUS") was prepared by the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors.

November Sitting 2012

ArgumentDocketCase PageIssue(s) or HoldingOpinion
10.31.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-444Missouri v. FryeThe Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel ex­tends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected, and that right applies to “all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”3.21.2012
10.31.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-209Lafler v. CooperWhere counsel’s ineffective advice led to an offer’s rejection, and where the prejudice alleged is having to stand trial, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice, there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the actual judgment and sentence imposed.3.21.2012
11.01.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-788Rehberg v. PaulkA witness in a grand jury proceeding is entitled to the same absolute immunity from suit under Section 1983 as a witness who testifies at trial.4.2.2012
11.01.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-1104Minneci v. PollardBecause state tort law authorizes adequate alternative damages actions in this case, no Bivens remedy can be implied.1.10.2012
11.02.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-895Gonzalez v. ThalerSection 2253(c)(3) is a mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule. The failure of a certificate of appealability to “indicate” a constitutional issue does not deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal. Moreover, for a state prisoner who does not seek review in a state’s high­est court, the judgment becomes “final” for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) upon “expiration of the time for seeking such review.” The petitioner’s appeal in this case was therefore untimely.1.10.2012
11.02.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-8974Perry v. New HampshireThe Due Process Clause does not require an inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances by law enforcement.1.11.2012
11.7.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-577Kawashima v. HolderViolations of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) and (2), which preclude making (or assisting in the making of) a false tax return, are crimes “involv[ing] fraud or deceit” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and are therefore aggravated felonies for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., when the loss to the govern­ment exceeds $10,000.2.21.2012
11.7.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-699M.B.Z. v. ClintonThe political question doctrine does not bar courts from deciding whether § 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which permits U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to request that their passports state “Israel” as their place of birth, impermissibly intrudes on the President’s powers under the Constitution.3.26.2012
11.8.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-1259U.S. v. JonesAttaching a GPS device to a vehicle and then using the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.1.23.2012
11.8.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-8145Smith v. CainThe substantial Brady claims in the case require a reversal of the petitioner’s conviction.1.10.2012
11.9.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-879Kurns v. Railroad Friction ProductsPetitioners’ state-law design-defect and failure-to-warn claims fall within the field of locomotive equipment regulation pre-empted by the Locomotive Inspection Act, as that field was defined in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.2.29.2012
11.9.2011
Tr.
Aud.
10-224National Meat Association v. HarrisThe Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly preempts a California law regulating the treatment of non-ambulatory pigs at federal­ly inspected slaughterhouses.1.23.2012

BEST-SELLING BOOKS by Charles Ware

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(4) Legal Consumer Tips and Secrets: Avoiding Debtors' Prison in the United States; and
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(5) Quince (15) Consejos Para Ganar Casos Del Inmigracion.
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"THE LAWYER'S MAILBOX": Featuring Attorney Charles Jerome Ware, http://thelawyersmailbox.blogspot.com

For eight years in the 1990s, Attorney Charles Ware hosted the extremely popular and enormously successful legal advice radio program "The Lawyer's Mailbox", the Number One (#1) legal advice radio program in the Mid-Atlantic Region, on WEAA 88.9 FM, Morgan State University Radio, in Baltimore, Maryland.

[www.CharlesJeromeWare.com; http://thelawyersmailbox.blogspot.com]

Recent books by Attorney and Author Charles Jerome Ware include best-sellers:

(1) The Secret Science of Winning Lotteries, Sweepstakes and Contests;
http://amzn.com/1432793888

(2) Understanding the Law: A Primer;
http://amzn.com/1440111456

(3) The Immigration Paradox: 15 Tips for Winning Immigration Cases;
http://amzn.com/1440171920

(4) Legal Consumer Tips and Secrets: Avoiding Debtors' Prison in the United States; and
http://amzn.com/1462051847

(5) Quince (15) Consejos Para Ganar Casos Del Inmigracion.
http://amzn.com/1462068952

Friday, October 12, 2012

QUOTE FOR THE DAY: From the Desk of Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

"Life is a sum of all your choices."

- Albert Camus: French Philosopher, Author, Journalist. Recipient of the 1957 Nobel Prize for Literature.

Thursday, October 11, 2012

"SCOTUS" UPDATE (SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES): Petitions for Conference on Friday, October 12, 2012

An update by Charles Ware, a principal in the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working.  Still committed.  Still here to make a difference."

Arizona v. The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.

(1) Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in creating a new, heightened preemption test under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution (“the Elections Clause”) that is contrary to the Supreme Court’s authority and conflicts with other circuit court decisions; and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that under that test the National Voter Registration Act preempts an Arizona law that requests persons who are registering to vote to show evidence that they are eligible to vote.

E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye

Whether the abstention doctrine announced in O’Shea v. Littleton requires federal courts to refrain from adjudicating claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 whenever it would “intrude” upon state-court administration in any manner, as the court below held in joining the Second and Sixth Circuits, or whether that doctrine requires abstention only when adjudication requires supervising specific state-court events or displacing their “day-to-day operations,” as the D.C. and First Circuits have held.

Ryan v. James

Whether the Ninth Circuit’s panel opinion conflicts with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and this Court's decisions in Harrington v. Richter, and Cullen v. Pinholster insofar as it (a) treated AEDPA’s deferential standard as a waivable defense, rather than an inherent restriction on a federal court’s authority, (b) refused to find that the state post-conviction (PCR) court issued a merits ruling on respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, when the state court expressly ruled that none of respondent’s PCR claims were colorable, and (c) considered evidence presented for the first time in federal court to grant habeas relief.

Gray v. Citigroup, Inc.

(1) Whether, under Section 1104(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, a fiduciary of a plan that invests in qualified employer securities who knows, or should have known, that it is imprudent to invest in the employer’s securities is permitted to take no steps to protect plan participants and beneficiaries unless the employer is in a “dire situation” or near bankruptcy; and (2) whether, under Section 1104(a)(1)(B), a complaint by a plan participant against a fiduciary of such a plan need only plead facts making plausible the conclusion that the fiduciary failed to act with “care, skill, prudence, and diligence,” or whether instead the complaint must plead facts making plausible the conclusion that the fiduciary knew, or should have known, that the employer was in a “dire situation” or near bankruptcy.

Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action

(1) Whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act; and (2) whether, if such claims are cognizable, they should be analyzed under the burden shifting approach used by three circuits, under the balancing test used by four circuits, under a hybrid approach used by two circuits, or by some other test: (a) what the correct test is for determining whether a prima facie case of disparate impact has been made; (b) how the statistical evidence should be evaluated; and (c) what the correct test is for determining when a defendant has satisfied its burden in a disparate impact case.

[www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ petitions we're watching]

MARYLAND DRUNK DRIVING AND VEHICULAR HOMICIDE: A Primer by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

Charles Ware is a principal in the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors. The firm's national headquarters are located in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland.

MARYLAND DRUNK DRIVING

As in other states, "drunk driving" in Maryland (i.e., DUI, or driving under the influence; and DWI, or driving while intoxicated) is a very serious offense which is treated as such by the State's law enforcement authorities. The odds are high that you can go to jail for drunk driving in Maryland.

(1) DUI (Driving Under the Influence) is the higher drunk driving alcohol violation in Maryland. Among other things, it means that the driver's BAC (blood alcohol concentration) registered a level of 0.08% or higher. It is treated severely in the sense that 12 points are automatically assessed against the defendant's driver's license, resulting in automatic revocation of the license; and the defendant could receive up to 1 year in jail and a 60-day driver's license revocation, etc.

Monetarily, the fine for a first DUI offense is $1,000, and it is $2,000 for a second offense. The real punishment, however, comes into play with the mandatory process of hiring a good attorney, going to court, getting alcohol assessments and evaluations, MVA (Motor Vehicle Administration) hearings, court-ordered monitoring, loss of pay or work, et al.

Proper response to a DUI charge can set the defendant back for over $10,000 in Maryland.

(2) DWI (Driving While Intoxicated) may be a slightly lesser offence to the DUI, but it is still a very serious offense in Maryland. Generally, if the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is found to be between 0.04% and 0.07%, he or she will be charged with a DWI.

In many cases, people who ended up on the lower end of the BAC spectrum but fail on a field sobriety test can end up with this charge. Police Officer judgment is a major factor. The end result is 8 points tallied against your driving record and a $500 fine (for both a first and second offense). Jail time can range from 60 days from the first offense and up to a year for the second.

(3) Drunk Driving Minors (drivers under 21 years) are prosecuted for DUI or DWI under a zero (0) tolerance rule in Maryland. Drivers under 21 years of age with a BAC level of 0.02 can have their driver's license suspended or revoked.

MARYLAND VEHICULAR HOMICIDE

Driving deaths ("Vehicular Homicides"), i.e., when persons are killed through the use of cars or other vehicles, are very serious crimes in Maryland and other states. The penalties in these cases almost invariably include prison terms.

Depending upon the factual circumstances of each case, prison terms for defendants can be substantially increased.

(1) What is the penalty for vehicular homicide (manslaughter) in Maryland?

Md. Ann. Code Criminal Law Art. § 2-209(b) provides that "A person may not cause the death of another as a result of the person's driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a grossly negligent manner."

A person convicted of violating this statute is guilty of a felony and is "subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both." Md. Criminal Law Art. § 2-209(d).

[www.dmv.org/md-maryland/automative-law/dui.php; www.ehow.com/facts/ "DWI & DUI Laws in Maryland"; criminal.lawyers.com/ Vehicular Homicide: Driving Deaths in General; www.nolo.com/legal-encylopedia/ DUI Laws in Maryland]

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS (SNTs): A Basic Primer by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

I. "Special Needs Trusts", also referred to as "Supplemental Needs Trusts", are designed to provide benefits, by means of trusts, to beneficiaries who would otherwise lose eligibility for public assistance (i.e., Supplemental Security Income or Medicaid).

The "beneficiary" of the special needs trust is the person who qualifies for public assistance by reason of some disability that makes that person unable to hold meaningful employment and with insufficient assets to provide adequate support.

II. Generally, there are four (4) types of "Special Needs Trusts":

"Disability" or Self-funded Trusts: These trusts, recognized by federal and state statutes, are established with property or funds belonging to the person with the disability. It does not apply to trusts funded with property of someone other than the person with the disability. These would be third party trusts discussed below.

The disability trust may be established for any person under the age of 65 years. The law requires that the trust is established by the person’s parent, grandparent, guardian or the court. Finally, the primary remainder beneficiary, at the death of the disabled beneficiary, must the state department that provides the person’s benefits. The state may be reimbursed to the extent that the state paid expenditures for medical assistance under Medicaid.

Third Party Created Trusts: Trusts funded by someone other than the beneficiary are third party trusts. A third party trust may benefit a person with a disability as long as it is a special needs trust. This kind of trust may be established either as a living (or “intervivos”) trust or a testamentary trust (created by a will).

Living Trusts: The living trust is ideal for a parent who wants to create a trust for a child who has a disability but does not want the child to lose eligibility for public benefits. If there are other family members who want to leave something by will but do not want to create a special needs trust in their wills, they can merely make the devise to the existing trust. The parent, of course, can make either lifetime or a gift by will to the trust.

Testamentary Trusts: To create a testamentary trust the parent merely makes a will and includes in it a special needs trust for the child with the disability. This avoids the complication of the intervivos trust, but does not afford other relatives the vehicle to leave a devise to the disabled child without the relative having to do the same.

III. Fundamentally, "special" or "supplemental" needs refers to anything that constitutes non-support items.

In other words, paying for anything the beneficiary wants for personal use that is not in the category of food or shelter (support expenses). A trust that is deemed special needs cannot provide food or shelter expenses or the trust will be deemed an available resource:

  1. Support expenditures are defined in the Social Security Procedures and Operations Manual System (POMS).
  2. It is easy to say no food or shelter but it can be tricky. For example, basic utilities such as gas, water and electricity are basic shelter expenses that cannot be paid by the trust. Utilities such as telephone and cable service are not basic and can be paid by the trust.
  3. Food cannot be purchased by the trust, but food supplements can. Non-consumable items such as toiletries, cleaning supplies and personal care items can be provided by the trust.
  4. Personal use by the beneficiary is important. If the beneficiary wishes to purchase something that is a legitimate purchase for the trust but intends it to be used by someone else, the purchase may not be allowed.
  5. As of March 9, 2005, there is no limit on the value of household goods as long as they are reasonably necessary for the person to live in his or her residence. Computers, furniture, and appliances are acceptable purchases.
  6. Purchase and maintenance of a motor vehicle, as well as paying the insurance is allowable. A motor vehicle is an exempt resource if used for the beneficiary. Other transportation expenses may be paid by the trust.
  7. Travel expenses, including a companion, can be paid by the trust. Travel expenses may include travel, accommodations and meals.
IV. Absolute and sole discretion for distribution of funds by the "trustee" of the special needs trust is extremely important:

  1. There can be no way in which the beneficiary can “legally” compel distribution from the trust.
  2. That does not mean that the trustee cannot ask the beneficiary what he or she wants (or vice versa). But the final decision is with the trustee.
  3. Prior approval by the trustee is important. The beneficiary should not incur a debt and then expect the trustee to pay for it.
  4. All purchases by the trust should be paid directly out of the trust. The trustee should never turn over cash to the beneficiary to buy a desired item. Cash is equivalent to support in terms of public benefit eligibility.
If the trustee is uncertain as to whether or not an expenditure constitutes a special or supplemental need, he or she should consult an attorney or other professional who is knowledgeable and specializes in special needs trusts.

Expenditures that are prohibited by federal or state regulations, or other mishandling of the trust, can result in the beneficiary being disqualified from public benefits.

[knowledgebase.findlaw.com/Kb/2009-09/ "What is a Special Needs Trust?"; www.olsentrager.com/ Denver, Colorado; www.dailyfinance.com/ 2012/09/28/ "Special Needs Trusts"/ Avoid the Biggest Mistake of Financial Planning for Special Needs Kids; www.hg.org/ Special Needs Trust-US]

DANNY GLOVER, HUGH GRANT, DEEPAK CHOPRA: CLIENT UPDATES BY ATTORNEY CHARLES JEROME WARE

The national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, is "here to make a difference".

(1) Actor, director, political activist DANNY GLOVER has been in the country of Venezuela as an electoral monitor for the recent presidential election in which Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez won his fourth presidential election.

(2) British actor HUGH GRANT spoke this week at the Conservative Conference 2012 in Birmingham, England on the subject of British prime minister David Cameron and the issue of press regulation.

(2) Best-selling author DEEPAK CHOPRA will be signing his new book, "God: A Story of Revelation", in the Chicago O'Hare International Airport on Friday, October 12th, 2012, from 2:00 PM to 3:00 PM.

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE: State versus Daughtry (2011) and State versus Miller (2009): Key Cases By Defense Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

State versus Daughtry (2011) and State versus Miller (2009): Key Cases By Defense Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

Maryland criminal law is a body of rules and statutes that defines conduct which is prohibited by the state of Maryland because the conduct threatens and harms public safety and welfare.  Maryland criminal law also establishes punishment to be imposed upon those who commit criminal acts and/or engage in criminal conduct.

State of Maryland v. Demetrius Daughtry, No. 81, September Term 2010, Maryland Court of Appeals (MCOA), Filed April 25, 2011:

CRIMINAL LAW – GUILTY PLEAS – VOLUNTARINESS – MARYLAND RULE 4-242 – PRESUMPTION THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL EXPLAINS CHARGES TO HIS/HER CLIENT. 

ALLOWING A TRIAL COURT, IN ENSURING THAT A GUILTY PLEA IS KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, AND ENTERED INTELLIGENTLY, TO RELY ON NOTHING MORE THAN A PRESUMPTION THAT “IN MOST CASES DEFENSE COUNSEL ROUTINELY EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO GIVE THE ACCUSED NOTICE OF . . . WHAT HE IS BEING ASKED TO ADMIT” RUNS CONTRARY TO MARYLAND RULE 4-242’s REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE AN ADEQUATE EXAMINATION “ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT.” 

ACCORDINGLY, WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS NOTHING MORE THAN THE FACT THAT A DEFENDANT IS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AND THAT THE DEFENDANT DISCUSSED GENERICALLY THE PLEA WITH HIS OR HER ATTORNEY, SUCH A PLEA COLLOQUY IS DEFICIENT UNDER RULE 4-242(c), AND THE PLEA MUST BE VACATED.
 
Chad Everette Miller v. State of Maryland, No. 645, September Term 2007, Maryland Court of Special Appeals (MCOSA), Filed May 4, 2009:
 
On May 14, 2007, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Chad Everette Miller, the appellant, entered a guilty plea to one count of burglary in the first degree. As part of a plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of 15 years’ incarceration, suspend all but five years, to be followed by a period of probation. The court was not bound by the recommendation, however. After hearing from the appellant and the victim, and after considering the appellant’s record, the court sentenced him to 15 years’ incarceration, with no period suspended. 
The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (MCOSA). The appellant supplemented his appeal with a written challenge to the “voluntariness” of his guilty plea. 
THE MCOSA granted the appellant’s application and ordered the parties
to brief the following question: 
Did the guilty plea voir dire establish that the [appellant] had the requisite understanding of the nature and elements of the crime of first-degree burglary?
 
 
The MCOSA concluded that the answer was "no".  The appellant's/defendant/s guilty plea voir dire did not establish that he had the requisite understanding of the nature and elements of the crime of first-degree burglary.
 
The MCOSA stated in its decision that the record in this case did not show that the appellant was informed during the plea hearing nor at any other time after being charged:
“Of course, there was no affirmative evidence that the appellant was never advised of that crime before pleading guilty. We have not uncovered any case decided post-Bradshaw, however, that has applied a presumption that a defendant pleaded guilty with knowledge of the nature and elements of the crime in the absence of any record evidence that he did so. As we said, it appears that a “knowledge of the nature and elements of the crime” presumption should not arise from legal representation alone. The record in this case does not show that the appellant knew the nature and elements of the charge of first-degree burglary when he entered his guilty plea. Accordingly, the plea must be vacated.”
 

VIRGINIA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: Fundamentals of Virginia Medical Negligence: PART 1

[This information is presented by the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors. Presentation of this information is intended to be helpful, but it does not establish, nor is it intended to establish, an attorney-client relationship. The reader is advised, urged and directed to contact a malpractice attorney with specific questions, and requests for advice and consultation. This information is general in nature, not intended to be complete or comprehensive, and may not reflect subsequent changes in the law. Specific questions should be directed to specific professionals for specific answers.]

Much of Virginia's law concerning medical malpractice is found in the state's Medical Malpractice Act, Va. Code Ann. §§8.01-581.1 to 8.01-581.20 (LEXIS 2003).

What is medical malpractice in Virginia?

Medical malpractice in Virginia, sometimes referred to as medical negligence, occurs when a health care provider violates the governing standard of care when providing treatment to a patient, causing the patient to suffer an injury.

Medical malpractice in Virginia can result from an action taken by the medical practitioner, or by the failure to take a medically appropriate action.

Examples of medical malpractice include:
  1. Misdiagnosis of, or failure to diagnose , a disease or medical condition;
  2. Failure to provide appropriate treatment for a medical condition;
  3. Unreasonable delay in treating a diagnosed medical condition;
Medical malpractice actions in Virginia can be brought by the injured patient against any responsible licensed health care provider, including doctors, counselors, psychologists and psychotherapists.

Statute of Limitations in Virginia

Medical malpractice actions in Virginia for injury (as opposed to death) should be brought within two years from the date the cause of action accrued, which is the date of injury. [Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-230 and 8.01-243(A) (LEXIS 2003)]. The Supreme Court has rejected the judicial adoption of a discovery rule, Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 492 S.E.2d 126, (1997), but holds that continuing treatment for the same conditions tolls the statute until treatment ends. Grubbs v. Rawls, 235 Va. 607, 369 S.E.2d 683 (1988).

In foreign object cases and cases of fraud or concealment, the statute is extended to one year from the date the object or injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, but this extension is subject to a ten-year limit from the time the cause of action accrued. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(C) (LEXIS 2003). Wrongful death actions must be brought within two years of death. [Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-244 (LEXIS 2003)].

A parent’s action for medical expenses caused by injury to a minor should be brought within five years. [Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(B) (LEXIS 2003)]. A minor’s medical malpractice action for injury or death must be commenced within two years from the date of the last act of negligence, unless the child is less than eight years of age, in which case the action must be brought by the child’s tenth birthday. [Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.1 (LEXIS 2003)]. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va. 653, 561 S.E.2d 705 (2002). Incapacity tolls the running of the statute of limitations. [Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-229(A) (LEXIS 2003)].

Virginia's Damage Caps.

Virginia imposes a cap on damages of all kinds in medical malpractice cases. For claims arising out of acts or omissions prior to August 1, 1999, the damage cap was $1 million. For acts or omissions on or after August 1, 1999, and before July 1, 2000, the cap was $1.5 million. The cap is increasing by $50,000 every July 1. Two final increases of $75,000 beginning in 2007 brought the damage cap to $2 million for acts or omissions on or after July 1, 2008. [Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.15 (LEXIS 2003)]. The Virginia Supreme Court has twice considered this legislation and held that it does not violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc., 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). A settlement with one defendant reduces the maximum liability of the others, because the cap limits the total amount recoverable for an injury to a patient, regardless of the number of theories or defendants. Fairfax Hospital System v. Nevitt, 249 Va. 591, 457 S.E.2d 10 (1995). This includes punitive damages. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990). In cases arising prior to March 28, 1994, when the definition of “health care provider” was broadened in Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.1 (LEXIS 2003), a physician’s professional corporation may be subject to uncapped liability. Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 482 S.E.2d 827 (1997).

Virginia limits punitive damages to $350,000. [Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (LEXIS 2003)]. This cap is also constitutional. Wackenhut Applied Technologies Center, Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Systems, Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).

PART 2 will be forthcoming.

Saturday, October 6, 2012

MCOA (MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS) BLOG: Tracey v. Solesky (Reconsideration) and State v. Harris

Tracey v. Solesky (Reconsideration) and State v. Harris

Charles Ware is the publisher and regular contributor to the "MCOA Blog", which he founded.  He is a principal in the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, which is headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland.  Among other recognitions, Charles Ware has been recognized as one of the "best attorneys and counsellors in the United States", and original recipient of the prestigious "Charles Hamilton Houston Award for Outstanding Litigation", an original and genuine superlawyer, and a best-selling author.

Dorothy M. Tracey v. Anthony K. Solesky, et al.;
No. 53; September Term, 2011, Filed August 21, 2012, On Motion for Reconsideration; Opinion by Justice Wilner
_________________________________________________________________________________

On April 26, 2012, the Maryland Court of Appeals (MCOA) filed an Opinion in this case holding, by a four-to-three vote, that, “upon a plaintiff’s sufficient proof that a dog involved in an attack is a pit
bull or a pit bull mix, and that the owner, or other person(s) who has the right to control the pit bull’s presence on the subject premises (including a landlord who has the right and/or opportunity to prohibit such dogs on leased premises as in this case) knows, or has reason to know, that the dog is a pit bull or cross-bred pit bull mix, that person is strictly liable for the damages caused to a plaintiff who is attacked by the dog on or from the owner’s or lessor’s premises” (bolding added).

On May 25, 2012, the petitioner, Dorothy Tracey filed a motion for reconsideration, complaining that the imposition of a “new duty” on landlords was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional as applied to her. An answer to the motion was filed by the respondents.

Decision and Order:  Because the so-called "cross-bred" issue was never raised in this case previously --- never asserted nor argued by either side --- it should not be included in this Court's decision.  The MCOA, therefore, removes references in its April 26, 2012 Opinion to pit bull "mixes", "cross-breeds", "cross-breds", and "hybrids".

Owners and landlords remain responsible, however, for injuries caused by so-called pure-bred dogs.

State of Maryland v. Thomas B. Harris;
No. 22; September Term, 2012, Filed September 27, 2012; Opinion by Chief Judge Bell
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CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE – JURIES & JURORS – COMMUNICATIONS

Any communication between a judge and the jury which pertains to the action constitutes a stage of trial at which a defendant, pursuant to Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Maryland Rule 4-231, is entitled to be present. Accordingly, Maryland Rule 4-326 (d) requires a trial judge to notify the parties if he or she wishes to communicate with a juror or the jury, or receives a communication from a juror or the jury, regarding a matter that pertains to the action.

Thomas B. Harris was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of second-degree depraved heart murder. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, where he argued, inter alia, that the trial court’s failure to disclose to him a communication between a juror and the judge’s secretary violated Maryland Rule 4-326 (d), requiring reversal of his conviction. The Court of Special Appeals agreed: it reversed the conviction, Harris v. State, 189 Md. App. 230, 255, 984 A.2d 314, 329 (2009), holding that the Circuit Court committed reversible error when it failed to disclose, in accordance with Rule 4-326 (d), the communication, and remanding the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial.

The State filed a petition (appeal) to the Maryland Court of Appeals (MCOA) for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.  The issue on appeal for consideration was:

     “Did the Court of Special Appeals err in finding that the trial court abused its
      discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial after informing the defendant of an
      innocuous communication between the judge’s secretary and a juror?”
 
The MCOA affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and held that the Circuit Court should have disclosed the communication between the judge’s secretary and the juror. Its failure to do so was error, in violation of Rule 4-326 (d), and prejudicial to the Defendant.

MCOA (MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS) BLOG: October 2012 Schedule

From the national general law practice of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working.  Still committed.  Still here to make a difference."

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
ARGUMENT SCHEDULE

Friday, October 5, 2012:

No. 14 State Department of Assessments and Taxation v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company

Issue - Taxation - Did the MD Tax Court correctly interpret Public Utilities Art. §§ 7-524 & 7-548 when it rejected an adjustment to the taxable gross receipts of a public utility, where the franchise tax is imposed on the statutorily-defined gross receipts from the utility's electricity distribution charges, where the adjustment sought by the utility was based on a credit that offset the increased cost to consumers of electricity generation, & where the offset did not alter the revenue received by the utility from its distribution service?

No. 17 Graylin Bernard Spence v. State of Maryland

Issues - Criminal Law - 1) Did CSA properly decline to address the legality of a sentence when that court vacated the conviction upon which the allegedly illegal sentence was based? 2) Was the evidence sufficient to establish that petitioner was subject to enhanced penalty as a subsequent offender? 3) Did CSA err in finding the trial court was obligated to conduct a MD Rule 4-215(e) hearing where the trial court was never apprised that Petitioner had a desire to discharge his assigned public defender?

No. 22 WSG Holdings v. Larry Bowie, et al.

Issues - Administrative Law - 1) Did CSA err when it found that objections to the site visit were preserved for appellate review & that there was no recorded vote or any recognition that the exclusion of some members of the public were subject to the procedural requirements of the state Open Meetings Act? 2) Did CSA err when it found that the March 17, 2009 site visit violated the open meeting requirement? 3) Did CSA err in reversing the judgment & remanding the matter to the Board for another hearing & decision without further instructions to the trial court and Board?


Tuesday, October 9, 2012:

No. 23 State of Maryland v. John Wesley Ray

Issue - Criminal Law - Did CSA err in reversing the lower court's proper denial of Respondent's motion to dismiss those re-instituted charges in light of Ray v. State, 410 Md. 385 (2009)?

No. 12 Maryland Insurance Commissioner v. Leon Kaplan

Issues - Insurance Law - 1) Did the Insurance Commissioner correctly find that ERISA does not preempt Md. Code Ann., Ins. §14-139, where there is no indication that Congress intended to preempt or supplant State efforts to protect assets of non-profit health insurers from depletion and where ERISA and §14-139 serve altogether different purposes? 2) Did the trial court err in holding that ERISA preempts any State regulatory action pursuant to §14-139 that affects the amount of any payment from an ERISA plan, even where the payment would be made out of corporate assets of the non-profit insurer? 3) Did the trial court err in failing to recognize that §14-139 regulates insurance & therefore is not preempted by ERISA?

No. 19 100 Investment Limited Partnership, et al. v. Columbia Town Center Title Company, et al.
Issues - Torts - 1) Did CSA err by holding that title companies do not owe a tort duty of care when conducting a title search? 2) Did CSA err by holding that the title insurer was not vicariously liable for the negligence of the title companies who were its agents?
Attorney for Petitioner: James E. Carbine
Attorney for Respondent: Richard E. Hagerty

Wednesday, October 10, 2012:

No. 21 Benn Ray, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al.

Issue - Real Property - Did CSA err when it ruled that Petitioners lacked standing because they were neither prima facie aggrieved nor specially aggrieved by the City's land use decision?

No. 18 Reginald McCracken v. State of Maryland

Issues - Criminal Law - 1) Does the plain-feel doctrine allow police to seize evidence when they have only reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, to associate that evidence with criminal activity? 2) Did CSA err in concluding the officer could seize a set of keys & a car remote because he had probable cause to believe they were evidence of "hacking"?

[www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/schedule/10/2schedule]
 

NURSING HOME NEGLIGENCE: $200,000,000 VERDICT!!! And More...

This update is sponsored by the national general law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working.  Still committed.  Still here to make a difference."

(1) $200,000,000.00 VERDICT: Nursing Home Malpractice - Estate Of Woman Sues After She Falls Down A Stairwell While Strapped To A Wheelchair - Wrongful Death.

In this case, a man sued after his elderly mother died at the nursing home after falling down the stairs while strapped to a wheelchair.  The woman suffered from dementia and was a resident at a Florida nursing home and rehabilitation center.  She showed a tendency to wander off.

The facts revealed in this case that the elderly woman wandered to the emergency exit stairwell of the facility through a door with a disabled (disconnected) alarm.  Apparently the alarm to the fire-door had been disconnected to enable the staff to smoke outside.  She fell down ten flights of stairs while strapped to a 45 pound wheelchair, and she was found over an hour later at the bottom of the stairs --- drowning in her own blood.  The woman, Elvira N., died from her injuries shortly after the paramedics arrived at the scene [Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida].

$60,000,000.00 of the jury award was for compensatory damages, and $140,000,000.00 was for punitive damages for gross negligence of the defendant nursing home.

(2) $100,000 RECOVERY:

Medical Malpractice – Nursing Home Negligence – Failure to report sexual assault on resident by another resident – 82-year-old female resident is sexually assaulted without any action by nursing home staff who suspected inappropriate conduct.

In this nursing home negligence matter, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant nursing home was negligent in failing to report sexual assault by one resident upon another and were told to "keep their eyes shut". The defendant denied the allegations and disputed any liability to the plaintiff [Massachusetts].

(3) $100,000 RECOVERY:

Medical Malpractice – Nursing Home Negligence – Plaintiff’s decedent falls out of bed and suffers a subdural hematoma which goes undiagnosed and untreated – Wrongful death of 79-year-old male.

In this nursing home negligence action, the estate of the decedent alleged that the defendant nursing facility failed to properly care for and treat the decedent leading to the decedent’s death from an undiagnosed and untreated subdural hematoma. The defendant nursing facility denied all liability [Pennsylvania].

(4) $200,000 VERDICT:

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE – NURSING HOME NEGLIGENCE – FAILURE TO PROPERLY TREAT PRESSURE WOUNDS – WRONGFUL DEATH – SURVIVAL ACTION.

This medical malpractice/wrongful death action was filed against eight defendants, in relation to five nursing home facilities in which the 68-year-old decedent resided prior to his death. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care and neglected the decedent, resulting in a dramatic increase in the severity of the decedent’s pressure wounds and a downward spiral in his condition [Pennsylvania].

(5) $150,000 RECOVERY:

Medical Malpractice – Nursing Home Negligence – Failure to properly care for pressure ulcers – Infection – Wrongful death.

In this nursing home negligence matter, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant nursing homes were negligent in their care and treatment of the plaintiff which resulted in pressure ulcers that became infected and resulted in the death of the plaintiff’s decedent. The defendants denied the allegations and disputed liability and causation.

Contact an attorney directly for further information and with specific questions.

[www.jvra.com/Verdict/10-3-2012]

Friday, October 5, 2012

THE "TERRY" STOP --- CRIMINAL TRIALS UPDATE BLOG: Defense Attorney Charles Jerome Ware

This information is provided as a courtesy by the national general law practice of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference".

Contact an attorney for specific answers to your specific questions.

THE "TERRY" STOP
A "Terry stop" is a brief detention of a person by police based upon reasonable suspicion of the person's involvement in criminal activity. A "Terry stop" is not an arrest. The name "Terry stop" comes from the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court held that police may briefly detain a person who they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity [and see, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District, 542 U.S.177 (2004)].
(1) "Terry" Stop in Maryland. On 2/14/2011, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (MCSA) ruled that a lower (circuit) court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress a gun found in the defendant's car during the police officer's "Terry" stop. The appellate court's reasoning was that the officer, who patted down the defendant based on "furtive" (stealthy or surreptitious) hand movements, failed to articulate in court sufficient grounds for the intrusion.
[In re Jeremy P., No. 1820, September Term, 2009]
(2) "Terry" Stop in the 11th Federal Circuit. On October 2nd 2012, the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that brief questioning by a police officer of a driver for reasons unrelated to the stop did not exceed the scope of a "constitutional stop and frisk". Therefore, the defendant's suppression in the trial court was reversed.
[United States v. Griffin, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20543 (11th Circuit, October 2nd, 2012); and see, United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F. 3d 298, 507 (4th Cir. 2011)]
(3) "Terry" Stop and Police Officer's "Incredible" Testimony. On October 3rd, 2012, the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals refused to overturn the conviction of a man who appealed, inter alia, because of the "incredibility" of the officer's testimony in making the "Terry" stop. According to the Court, the officer's testimony may well have been incredible, and consequently unreliable, but it was not "contrary to the laws of nature or so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no fact finder could accept it".
[United States v. Dixon, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20617 (11th Circuit, October 3rd, 2012); an unpublished opinion out of the Middle District of Florida]
[thedailyrecord.com/ 2011-02-13/Opinions/Maryland Court of Special Appeals; see, Maryland v. Shatzer, __U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010); www.fourthamendment.com/blog; lawyersusaonline.com/blog/2012/10/04]