Sunday, October 13, 2013

D. C. " PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE ": A BRIEF BY ATTORNEY CHARLES WARE

www.charlesjeromeware.com.  Attorney Charles Jerome Ware is  founder and senior partner of the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P. A., Attorneys and Counselors. The firm is renowned and well-respected , and it is conveniently located in the Baltimore - Washington, D. C. area. For an initial courtesy consultation, contact us at (410) 730-5016 or (410) 720-6129, or www.charlesjeromeware.com.  Charles Ware is also a best-selling author of several books.

Two recent (2013)  civil cases shed current light on the issue of the District of Columbia's  " public
duty doctrine": Christine Osborne, et al. vs. District of Columbia, C.A. No.  2013 CA 004488 B, Superior
Court of  the District of Columbia [ Decided 09/23/2013], and Woods vs. District of Columbia, No.
11-CV-1011, D.C. Court of Appeals [ Decided 03/28/2013]. In both cases the D.C. public duty doctrine prevailed and the cases were dismissed.

                                 PUBLIC  DUTY  DOCTRINE

 In a nutshell, under the public duty doctrine, the " District [of Columbia] has no duty to provide public services to any particular citizen" unless there is a " special relationship" between the emergency personnel --- police officers, firefighters, and EMTs --- and an individual.  Allison Gas
Turbine Division of General Motors Corporation v. District of Columbia, 642 A.2d 841, 843 ( D.C.  1994).

 The " general duty owed to the public may become a specific duty owed to an individual if the [ emergency personnel] and the individual are in a special relationship different from that existing between [ emergency personnel] and citizens generally."  Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1,
3,4 ( D.C. 1981) ( en banc). That determination is made by applying the now-familiar 2-part test,
which holds that a special relationship is formed where there is (1) "direct contact or some other form of privity between the victim and the [ emergency personnel] so that the victim becomes a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff"  and  (2) specific assurances of [emergency] services that create justifiable reliance by the victim." Id at 11; also see, Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A. 2d 1123 (D.C. 1992); and, Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A. 2d. 718, 719 ( D.C. 1990).

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