Charles Ware is a principal and founder in the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
Civil judgments are frequently reversed or reduced by civil judges. Take, for instance, the case of Kathryn Murphy.
Murphy, the former principal of a successful Florida Charter school, won a handsome but disputed $155,700,000.00 jury verdict against the city manager, Eric Soroka, in her school district for "destroying her reputation".
Unfortunately for her, however, plaintiff Murphy lost her courtroom victory just three (3) days after the monster verdict when the local trial judge reversed the entire $155.7 million award!
In the court's reasons for erasing the award the trial judge found/decided:
(1) the city defendant manager who fired her and allegedly "destroyed her reputation was entitled to absolute (municipal official) immunity as a matter of law because his actions were within the scope of his functions as city manner; and further, (2) Murphy was an at-will employee who could be terminated from her job for any reason.
[www.miamiherald.com/11-8-2012/ "Judge Strikes Down $155 Million Verdict In Aventura School Case"; eyeonmiami.blogspot.com/11-9-2012/ "Eye On Miami: That $155 Million Jury [Award] Reversed"; and see, Dr. Katherine Murphy vs. Aventura City of Excellence School, et al., Case No. 09-57209-CA-27, Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit In And For Miami-Dade County, Florida]
Friday, November 30, 2012
THE DIVERSITY VISA (DV) LOTTERY PROGRAM versus Green Card Lottery Scams
Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, is a national law firm headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland.
Charles Ware is a noted best-selling author and attorney, microeconomist, lotterician, sweepstaker and contester. He is also a former United States Immigration Judge.
[Read: "E. The Green Card Lottery Scam", in Chapter 10 (Winning The Lottery By Avoiding Lottery Scams), THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING LOTTERIES, SWEEPSTAKES AND CONTESTS: Laws, Strategies, Formulas and Statistics, Charles Jerome Ware, Outskirts Press, Inc.: Denver, Colorado (2012) http://amzn.com/1432793888; The Immigration Paradox: Fifteen (15) Tips for Winning Immigration Cases, Charles Jerome Ware (former U.S. Immigration Judge, iUniverse Pub. (2009); Quince (15) Consejos Para Ganar Casos De Inmigracion, Charles Jerome Ware, ex Juez de Inmigracion de los Estados Unido, iUniverse (2011); U.S. State Department Website]
Charles Ware is a noted best-selling author and attorney, microeconomist, lotterician, sweepstaker and contester. He is also a former United States Immigration Judge.
[Read: "E. The Green Card Lottery Scam", in Chapter 10 (Winning The Lottery By Avoiding Lottery Scams), THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING LOTTERIES, SWEEPSTAKES AND CONTESTS: Laws, Strategies, Formulas and Statistics, Charles Jerome Ware, Outskirts Press, Inc.: Denver, Colorado (2012) http://amzn.com/1432793888; The Immigration Paradox: Fifteen (15) Tips for Winning Immigration Cases, Charles Jerome Ware (former U.S. Immigration Judge, iUniverse Pub. (2009); Quince (15) Consejos Para Ganar Casos De Inmigracion, Charles Jerome Ware, ex Juez de Inmigracion de los Estados Unido, iUniverse (2011); U.S. State Department Website]
MARYLAND POWERBALL WINNING LOTTERY WAREHOUSE: SECRETS TO WINNING POWERBALL BY DR. CHARLES JEROME WARE
When it comes to winning lotteries, sweepstakes and contests, "luck" counts but "preparation" rules! This fact includes the Maryland Lottery as well as Powerball!
[Chapter 12, "Summary of the Secret Science of Winning Lotteries, Sweepstakes and Contests: Laws, Strategies, Formulas and Statistics, Charles Jerome Ware, Outskirts Press, Inc.: Denver Colorado (2012) http://amzn.com/1432793888 ]
This best-selling book is available on amazon.com as well as other major book distribution outlets.
[Chapter 12, "Summary of the Secret Science of Winning Lotteries, Sweepstakes and Contests: Laws, Strategies, Formulas and Statistics, Charles Jerome Ware, Outskirts Press, Inc.: Denver Colorado (2012) http://amzn.com/1432793888 ]
This best-selling book is available on amazon.com as well as other major book distribution outlets.
When it comes to lotteries, sweepstakes and contests, there are ways to improve your odds or probability of winning. They are discussed in this book, with a lot of detail and some humor. Blind reliance on luck or chance is not necessary to win lotteries, sweepstakes and contests. The“4Ps” of persistence, preparation, poise and a positive mental attitude are necessary to win on a consistent or regular basis. Therefore, just about anyone is capable of winning.
Charles Jerome Ware is a noted author and attorney, microeconomist, lotterician, sweepstaker and contester. He is a principal in the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, Attorneys and Counselors. Dr. Ware is a highly successful and life-long sweepstaker and contester. He is also a successful lotterician who, for several years, has investigated, monitored and researched lotteries throughout the United States Columbia , Maryland
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
MARYLAND SHOPLIFTING WAREHOUSE: What You Need To Know About Shoplifting Arrests In Maryland
Attorney Charles Jerome Ware is a principal and founder of the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, which is headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
Attorney Ware has successfully handled hundreds of shoplifting cases during his career, and he has lectured to other attorneys on the subject of defense of the shoplifter.
Charles Ware has for many years been considered, awarded, and ranked among the best attorneys and counsellors in the United States [see, The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, The Baltimore Sun, The Columbia Flier, The Howard County Times, et al.]
In a nutshell, in Maryland "shoplifting" is simply the taking of merchandise out of a store without permission and/or without paying for it. The laws and penalties for shoplifting crimes in Maryland are outlined herein, infra. Punishment may include fines, jail or prison time, community service, restitution, and other penalties such as being prohibited from returning to the store (which, in my opinion, is probably a blessing).
Maryland shoplifting laws are considered among many to be some of the most severe in the country.
In Maryland, a misdemeanor shoplifting offense refers to theft of property from a merchant valued at $1,000 or less:
(a) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued under $100 is punishable by a fine up to $500 and up to 90 days in jail.
(b) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued at $1,000 or less with at least two or more prior convictions is punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 and up to 5 years in prison (Maryland's Department of Corrections).
Of course, felony shoplifting (theft) laws have harsher punishments:
(a) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 is punishable by as much as $10,000 in fines and up to 10 years in prison.
(b) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued between $10,000 and $100,000 is punishable by as much as $15,000 in fines and up to 15 years in prison.
(c) Shoplifting (theft) of property exceeding $100,000 in value is punishable by as much as $25,000 in fines and up to 25 years in prison.
[Maryland Code § 3-1301, 3-1302, 3-1303, and 3-1304]
Maryland law offers some first-time offenders pre-trial diversion programs to avoid criminal charges, as well as plea bargains to reduce their charges.
[see, www.ehow.com/info/maryland shoplifting laws and penalties; shopliftinglaws.org/maryland; www.shopliftingprevtion.org/laws; definitions.uslegal.com/shoplifting; www.onlinelawyersource.com/shopliftinglaws]
Attorney Ware has successfully handled hundreds of shoplifting cases during his career, and he has lectured to other attorneys on the subject of defense of the shoplifter.
Charles Ware has for many years been considered, awarded, and ranked among the best attorneys and counsellors in the United States [see, The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, The Baltimore Sun, The Columbia Flier, The Howard County Times, et al.]
Shoplifting in Maryland
In a nutshell, in Maryland "shoplifting" is simply the taking of merchandise out of a store without permission and/or without paying for it. The laws and penalties for shoplifting crimes in Maryland are outlined herein, infra. Punishment may include fines, jail or prison time, community service, restitution, and other penalties such as being prohibited from returning to the store (which, in my opinion, is probably a blessing).
Maryland shoplifting laws are considered among many to be some of the most severe in the country.
Misdemeanor Penalties for Shoplifting in Maryland
In Maryland, a misdemeanor shoplifting offense refers to theft of property from a merchant valued at $1,000 or less:
(a) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued under $100 is punishable by a fine up to $500 and up to 90 days in jail.
(b) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued at $1,000 or less with at least two or more prior convictions is punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 and up to 5 years in prison (Maryland's Department of Corrections).
Felony Penalties for Shoplifting in Maryland
Of course, felony shoplifting (theft) laws have harsher punishments:
(a) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 is punishable by as much as $10,000 in fines and up to 10 years in prison.
(b) Shoplifting (theft) of property valued between $10,000 and $100,000 is punishable by as much as $15,000 in fines and up to 15 years in prison.
(c) Shoplifting (theft) of property exceeding $100,000 in value is punishable by as much as $25,000 in fines and up to 25 years in prison.
[Maryland Code § 3-1301, 3-1302, 3-1303, and 3-1304]
Maryland law offers some first-time offenders pre-trial diversion programs to avoid criminal charges, as well as plea bargains to reduce their charges.
[see, www.ehow.com/info/maryland shoplifting laws and penalties; shopliftinglaws.org/maryland; www.shopliftingprevtion.org/laws; definitions.uslegal.com/shoplifting; www.onlinelawyersource.com/shopliftinglaws]
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
MARYLAND CAR ACCIDENT WAREHOUSE
CAR ACCIDENTS IN MARYLAND AND WASHINGTON, D.C.: A Primer By Personal Injury Attorney Charles Jerome Ware (PART I)
The national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, specializes in car accidents in the Maryland and Washington, D.C. geographic area. We are: "Still here. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
Without a doubt, the vast majority of cases in state and federal courts in the United States involve cars (automobiles). A huge percentage of these cases involve "car accidents", aka "automobile accidents".
In Maryland, for instance, traffic crashes are the number 1 killer of people between the ages of 4 and 34. Each year, in Maryland, traffic crashes kill more people than homicides. In fact, it is reported that the frequency of car accidents in the city of Baltimore, Maryland ranks 2nd worst in the United States.
Only drivers in Washington, D.C. experience car crashes more often than Baltimore, Maryland.
[www.nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Understanding the Law: A Primer, Charles Jerome Ware, iUniverse Publishers (2008); www.mva.maryland.gov/Driver Safety/Stats/Maryland Crash Summary]
Actually, more than 90% of total crashes in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and throughout the United States are preventable accidents caused by "driver error".
[Source: Maryland Highway Safety Office, www.mva.maryland.gov; Maryland Crash Summary].
In 2010, approximately 32,885 people died in "motor vehicle traffic crashes in the United States". Also in the same year, an estimated 2,240,000 people were injured in motor vehicle crashes.
[see, "Traffic Safety Facts, Research Note," Revised February 2012, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), DOT HS 811 552].
STEPS TO TAKE AFTER A CAR ACCIDENT IN MARYLAND AND WASHINGTON, D.C.:
1. Be deliberate, methodical, and safe. Stop the car, turn off the engine, and if you can physically and safely do so, exit the car. Think safety.
2. Call 911. You will need the police; and you may need an ambulance.
3. Try to get the personal information (name, address, telephone) on any witnesses.
4. Otherwise, try to be quiet. Avoid what us lawyers call "spontaneous utterances".
5. If you are injured, seek medical attention.
6. Try to listen and remember as many details about the accident as possible.
7. If you have a camera or camera phone, take pictures of the scene and damage.
8. Seek legal counsel before making reports to insurance companies.
MARYLAND CAR DEATH: The Laws By Wrongful Death Attorney Charles Jerome Ware
The national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, is a premier wrongful death law firm headquartered in Maryland and Washington, D.C. We are: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Fatality Analysis Reporting System, at least 493 car deaths occurred in Maryland in 2010 alone. In that same year, 32,885 people died in motor vehicle traffic crashes in the United States.
Further, according to Transportation for America (TA), an advocacy group, Maryland is ranked 15th among the most dangerous states for pedestrians. From 2000 to 2009, according to TA, about 47,700 pedestrians were killed in the United States.
The Maryland Wrongful Death Statute can be found in Md. Courts And Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. § 3-904. Pursuant to the Act, the following persons shall be the primary beneficiaries in a wrongful death action:
1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, an action under this subtitle shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased person.
(2) A parent may not be a beneficiary in a wrongful death action for the death of a child of the parent if:
(i)
1. The parent is convicted under §§ 3-303 through 3-308, § 3-323, § 3-601, or § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article; or
2. The parent committed an act prohibited under §§ 3-303 through 3-308, § 3-323, § 3-601, or § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article;
(ii) The other parent of the child is the victim of the crime or act described under item (i) of this paragraph; and
(iii) The other parent of the child is a child of the parent.
(3) (i) An action under this subtitle for the wrongful death of a child caused by the parent of the child allowed under the provisions of § 5-806 of this article may not be for the benefit of that parent of the deceased child.
(ii) An action under this subtitle for the wrongful death of a parent caused by a child of the parent allowed under the provisions of § 5-806 of this article may not be for the benefit of that child of the deceased parent.
If there are no persons who qualify under subsection (a), an action shall be for the benefit of any person related to the deceased person by blood or marriage who was substantially dependent upon the deceased.
In an action under this subtitle, damages may be awarded to the beneficiaries proportional to the injury resulting from the wrongful death. The amount shall be recovered and divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict.
The damages awarded for death of a spouse, a minor child, or a parent are not limited or restricted by the “pecuniary loss” or “pecuniary benefit” rule but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable. An unmarried child who is not a minor child is also included in the category if: (i) the child is 21 years old or younger; or (ii) a parent contributed 50 percent or more of the child’s support within the 12-month period immediately before the date of death of the child.
Except when death is caused by a disease caused by exposure to any toxic substance in the person’s workplace and contracted by a person in the course of the person’s employment. an action under this subtitle shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person. However, If an occupational disease was a cause of a person’s death, an action shall be filed: within 10 years of the time of death; or Within 3 years of the date when the cause of death was discovered, whichever is less.
For the purposes of this section, a person born to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other is considered to be the child of the mother. The person is considered to be the child of the father only if the father:
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in a proceeding brought under § 5-1010 of the Family Law Article or § 1-208 of the Estates and Trusts Article; or
(2) Prior to the death of the child:
(i) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father;
(ii) Has openly and notoriously recognized the person to be his child; or
(iii) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the father[i].
[i] Md. Courts And Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. § 3-904
[death.uslegal.com/ Maryland Wrongful Death Laws; y4america.org/ Transportation for America; Traffic Safety Facts, NHTSA, U.S. Department of Transportation (DoT), DoT HS 811 552, Revised February 2012]
WRONGFUL DEATH IN MARYLAND: A Primer by Maryland Attorney Charles Jerome Ware
The attorneys at the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., regret hearing about the wrongful death of anyone, but we are here for you and your loved ones when you have a wrongful death claim.
We recognize and understand the tremendous agony and emotional strain you are experiencing in this process, and we want to help you in any way possible to survive it.
Survival Actions and Wrongful Death Actions In Maryland
When a victim dies in an accident or from medical malpractice in Maryland, the deceased person's family may typically file two separate claims: a "survival action" and a "wrongful death" action.
The "survival action" is an action brought on behalf of the personal representative for the estate of the deceased, claiming recovery for the injuries suffered by the victim. Maryland law allows compensation to the deceased victim's estate for the pain and suffering and other damages, and actual expenses incurred by the victim that were suffered up to the moment of death.
The "wrongful death action" is brought by the relatives of the victim and it seeks compensation for the victim's accidental death.
In a survival action in Maryland, damages are measured in terms of harm to the actual. victim. The personal representative serves as the posthumous agent of the victim. In a wrongful death action in Maryland, damages are measured in terms of harm to loved ones as a result of the loss of the victim. In this case, the surviving relatives do not serve the agent for the decedent and act on their own behalf for their own loss.
One chief difference between a survival statute and a wrongful death statute is that if death is instantaneous, there can be no cause of action except for medical bills and funeral expenses under the Maryland survival statute. Of course, this is a fallacy of law; no one can argue that a parent who does not get to see their children grow up has not suffered a loss. But the law gives that claim to the children under the survival statute.
Statutes of Limitations
Any medical malpractice action must be filed either within five years from the date when the injury was committed or three years from the date when the injury was discovered, whichever is earlier [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-109 (1995)]. Against a minor, the statute does not begin to run until a claimant has reached the age of eleven, and if the action involves a foreign object or injury to the reproductive system, the statute does not begin to run until the claimant is sixteen. Id. Maryland’s highest court has held that the five-year part of the statute is not measured from the date treatment ends and does not violate the state constitution [Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985)].A wrongful death action brought by the decedent’s dependents must be filed within three years after death [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 (1995)]. This statute applies to a wrongful death action brought on a medical malpractice theory, while § 5-109 applies to a survival action brought by the decedent’s estate.[Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988)].
Some Wrongful Death Awards
- $3,000,000 Jury Award for Maryland pedestrian death.
- $1,300,000 Award. Wrongful death caused by hypertensive stroke during pregnancy (preeclampsia and eclampsia) arising from physician and nursing negligence in the hospital.
- $2,000,000 Award for Road Rage Wrongful Death [Attorney for Plaintiffs: Charles Jerome Ware]
- $1,125,000 Award for wrongful death resulting from failure to treat deep vein thrombosis (DVT), pulmonary embolus (PE) and negligent discharge from the hospital.
- $1,100,000.00 Award for wrongful death caused by negligent insertion of a chest tube in the emergency room.
[www.millerandzois.com/Wrongful Death, Survival Actions; www.mcandl.com/ Maryland Medical Malpractice; Understanding the Law: A Primer, by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware, iUniverse Publishers; voices.washingtonpost.com/crim-scene/ $3 Million Jury Award/ 03-11-2011]
MARYLAND DRUNK DRIVING WAREHOUSE:
Among the best attorneys in the United States [GQ Magazine, The Washington Post, The Baltimore Sun, The Columbia Flier, The Howard County Sun, The Anniston Star, The New York Times, et al.]
As in other states, "drunk driving" in Maryland (i.e., DUI, or driving under the influence; and DWI, or driving while intoxicated) is a very serious offense which is treated as such by the State's law enforcement authorities. The odds are high that you can go to jail for drunk driving in Maryland.
(1) DUI (Driving Under the Influence) is the higher drunk driving alcohol violation in Maryland. Among other things, it means that the driver's BAC (blood alcohol concentration) registered a level of 0.08% or higher. It is treated severely in the sense that 12 points are automatically assessed against the defendant's driver's license, resulting in automatic revocation of the license; and the defendant could receive up to 1 year in jail and a 60-day driver's license revocation, etc.
Monetarily, the fine for a first DUI offense is $1,000, and it is $2,000 for a second offense. The real punishment, however, comes into play with the mandatory process of hiring a good attorney, going to court, getting alcohol assessments and evaluations, MVA (Motor Vehicle Administration) hearings, court-ordered monitoring, loss of pay or work, et al.
Proper response to a DUI charge can set the defendant back for over $10,000 in Maryland.
(2) DWI (Driving While Intoxicated) may be a slightly lesser offence to the DUI, but it is still a very serious offense in Maryland. Generally, if the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is found to be between 0.04% and 0.07%, he or she will be charged with a DWI.
In many cases, people who ended up on the lower end of the BAC spectrum but fail on a field sobriety test can end up with this charge. Police Officer judgment is a major factor. The end result is 8 points tallied against your driving record and a $500 fine (for both a first and second offense). Jail time can range from 60 days from the first offense and up to a year for the second.
(3) Drunk Driving Minors (drivers under 21 years) are prosecuted for DUI or DWI under a zero (0) tolerance rule in Maryland. Drivers under 21 years of age with a BAC level of 0.02 can have their driver's license suspended or revoked.
Driving deaths ("Vehicular Homicides"), i.e., when persons are killed through the use of cars or other vehicles, are very serious crimes in Maryland and other states. The penalties in these cases almost invariably include prison terms.
Depending upon the factual circumstances of each case, prison terms for defendants can be substantially increased.
What is the penalty for vehicular homicide (manslaughter) in Maryland?
Md. Ann. Code Criminal Law Art. § 2-209(b) provides that "A person may not cause the death of another as a result of the person's driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a grossly negligent manner."
A person convicted of violating this statute is guilty of a felony and is "subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both." Md. Criminal Law Art. § 2-209(d).
[www.dmv.org/md-maryland/automative-law/dui.php; www.ehow.com/facts/ "DWI & DUI Laws in Maryland"; criminal.lawyers.com/ Vehicular Homicide: Driving Deaths in General; www.nolo.com/legal-encylopedia/ DUI Laws in Maryland]
MARYLAND DRUNK DRIVING
As in other states, "drunk driving" in Maryland (i.e., DUI, or driving under the influence; and DWI, or driving while intoxicated) is a very serious offense which is treated as such by the State's law enforcement authorities. The odds are high that you can go to jail for drunk driving in Maryland.
(1) DUI (Driving Under the Influence) is the higher drunk driving alcohol violation in Maryland. Among other things, it means that the driver's BAC (blood alcohol concentration) registered a level of 0.08% or higher. It is treated severely in the sense that 12 points are automatically assessed against the defendant's driver's license, resulting in automatic revocation of the license; and the defendant could receive up to 1 year in jail and a 60-day driver's license revocation, etc.
Monetarily, the fine for a first DUI offense is $1,000, and it is $2,000 for a second offense. The real punishment, however, comes into play with the mandatory process of hiring a good attorney, going to court, getting alcohol assessments and evaluations, MVA (Motor Vehicle Administration) hearings, court-ordered monitoring, loss of pay or work, et al.
Proper response to a DUI charge can set the defendant back for over $10,000 in Maryland.
(2) DWI (Driving While Intoxicated) may be a slightly lesser offence to the DUI, but it is still a very serious offense in Maryland. Generally, if the defendant's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is found to be between 0.04% and 0.07%, he or she will be charged with a DWI.
In many cases, people who ended up on the lower end of the BAC spectrum but fail on a field sobriety test can end up with this charge. Police Officer judgment is a major factor. The end result is 8 points tallied against your driving record and a $500 fine (for both a first and second offense). Jail time can range from 60 days from the first offense and up to a year for the second.
(3) Drunk Driving Minors (drivers under 21 years) are prosecuted for DUI or DWI under a zero (0) tolerance rule in Maryland. Drivers under 21 years of age with a BAC level of 0.02 can have their driver's license suspended or revoked.
MARYLAND VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
Driving deaths ("Vehicular Homicides"), i.e., when persons are killed through the use of cars or other vehicles, are very serious crimes in Maryland and other states. The penalties in these cases almost invariably include prison terms.
Depending upon the factual circumstances of each case, prison terms for defendants can be substantially increased.
What is the penalty for vehicular homicide (manslaughter) in Maryland?
Md. Ann. Code Criminal Law Art. § 2-209(b) provides that "A person may not cause the death of another as a result of the person's driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a grossly negligent manner."
A person convicted of violating this statute is guilty of a felony and is "subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000, or both." Md. Criminal Law Art. § 2-209(d).
[www.dmv.org/md-maryland/automative-law/dui.php; www.ehow.com/facts/ "DWI & DUI Laws in Maryland"; criminal.lawyers.com/ Vehicular Homicide: Driving Deaths in General; www.nolo.com/legal-encylopedia/ DUI Laws in Maryland]
Monday, November 26, 2012
MARYLAND MALPRACTICE WAREHOUSE
The national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, presents this blog as a public service. The motto for this award-winning law firm is: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
[see, Chapter Two, "Medical Malpractice", Legal Consumer Tips and Secrets, by Charles Jerome Ware, iUniverse (2011); "The Four Elements of Medical Malpractice", Yale University Medical Center: Issues in Risk Management, info.med.yale.edu (1997); "Changing the Malpractice System", by Clive E. Reinhardt, The New York Times, October 1, 2010; "The Facts About Medical Malpractice in Maryland", Public Citizen Congress Watch, Rev. January 2004; "Notes from the Chair of the Board", newsletter of the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland, October 2002; "28% Rise Sought to Insure Doctors", Greg Garland, Baltimore Sun, June 28, 2003; "Medical Reform Locked in Fight", Stephanie Desmon, Baltimore Sun, March 17, 2003]
A wrongful death action brought by the decedent’s dependents must be filed within three years after death [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 (1995)]. This statute applies to a wrongful death action brought on a medical malpractice theory, while § 5-109 applies to a survival action brought by the decedent’s estate [Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988)].
MARYLAND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WAREHOUSE
[see, Chapter Two, "Medical Malpractice", Legal Consumer Tips and Secrets, by Charles Jerome Ware, iUniverse (2011); "The Four Elements of Medical Malpractice", Yale University Medical Center: Issues in Risk Management, info.med.yale.edu (1997); "Changing the Malpractice System", by Clive E. Reinhardt, The New York Times, October 1, 2010; "The Facts About Medical Malpractice in Maryland", Public Citizen Congress Watch, Rev. January 2004; "Notes from the Chair of the Board", newsletter of the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland, October 2002; "28% Rise Sought to Insure Doctors", Greg Garland, Baltimore Sun, June 28, 2003; "Medical Reform Locked in Fight", Stephanie Desmon, Baltimore Sun, March 17, 2003]
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Generally, in Maryland any medical malpractice action must be filed either within five (5) years from the date when the injury was committed or three (3) years from the date when the injury was first discovered, whichever is earlier [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-109 (1995)]. Against a minor, the statute does not begin to run until a claimant has reached the age of eleven, and if the action involves a foreign object or injury to the reproductive system, the statute does not begin to run until the claimant is sixteen. Id. Maryland’s highest court has held that the five-year part of the statute is not measured from the date treatment ends and does not violate the state constitution [Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985)].
CONTRIBUTORY OR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Maryland is one of the few remaining states that recognizes the traditional common law doctrine of contributory negligence. [Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Ed., 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983)]. Thus, any negligence by a claimant may bar his recovery completely.
Maryland imposes a limit on recoverable non-economic damages for any personal injury cause of action for medical malpractice accruing after July 1, 1986. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997). The limit was originally $350,000, but for causes of actions arising on or after October 1, 1994, the limit has been increased to $500,000. Id. Beginning October 1, 1995, and every October 1 thereafter, the limit on non-economic damages is increased by $15,000. Id. Non-economic damages include pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and other non-pecuniary damages, but not punitive damages. Id. The damage cap applies to each “direct victim” of the tort and all those claiming injury by or through him [Id.; Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (1995) (a single cap applies to the injured person’s claim and the spouse’s consortium claim). This statute does not violate Maryland’s constitution. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992)].
Prior to the 1994 amendment, the statute had been held not to apply to wrongful death cases [United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993). However, the statute now provides that the cap applies to wrongful death, and that the total recovery of all beneficiaries in a wrongful death case cannot exceed 150 percent of the cap. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997)].
Medical Malpractice Cap
____________________________________________________
[see, www.millerandzois.com/maryland-medical-malpractice-cap]
[No attorney-client relationship is established with anyone merely through this abovereferenced blog and/or information. Always seek personal professional advice and consultation].
Periodic Payments of Damages
Maryland courts and arbitration panels are afforded the power to order that future damages be paid in the form of periodic payments, subject to adequate security [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-109 (1995)]. Upon the death of a claimant receiving periodic payments, the unpaid balance for future medical expenses reverts to the defendant. Id.
The liability of any local government in Maryland is capped at $200,000 per claim and $500,000 per occurrence. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303 (Supp. 1997). Local governments are immune from liability for punitive damages. Id. The purchase of liability insurance does not waive the entity’s immunity [See Quecedo v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 590, 287 A.2d 257 (1972) (holding that in the absence of statute to the contrary, a county that maintains liability insurance does not waive its immunity)].
MARYLAND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WAREHOUSE
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimony is required in all successful Maryland medical malpractice cases. Maryland Code, § 3-2A-04 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), requires a person who wishes to pursue a claim against a health care provider for damages due to medical injury to file the claim with the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office.
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
In Maryland, joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable; each must assume and bear the responsibility for the misconduct of all [Carroll v. Kerrigen, 173 Md. 627, 197 A. 127 (1938); Cooper v. Bikle, 334 Md. 608, 640 A.2d 1120 (1994)].
CONTRIBUTION
In Maryland a joint tortfeasor who pays more than his pro rata share has a right of contribution against other joint tortfeasors whose liability was extinguished by the judgment or settlement and who have not paid their pro rata share. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1402 (Supp. 1997). The tortfeasors’ pro rata shares are determined by dividing the judgment equally among the tortfeasors [Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Travel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980)].
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Maryland, a hospital may, under appropriate circumstances, be held responsible for the negligent acts of its independently- contracted physicians, based on principles of apparent agency [Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977) (holding that an apparent agency relationship existed because the hospital did nothing to indicate an emergency physician’s true status as an independent contractor)].
DAMAGES
As in most other states, the issue of damages continues to be a major issue in Maryland.
Prior to the 1994 amendment, the statute had been held not to apply to wrongful death cases [United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993). However, the statute now provides that the cap applies to wrongful death, and that the total recovery of all beneficiaries in a wrongful death case cannot exceed 150 percent of the cap. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-108 (Supp. 1997)].
Medical Malpractice Cap
on Damages in Maryland
| Medical Malpractice (MD CODE, CTS. & JUD. PROC. §3-2A-09) | |||
| Cause of action arises on or after | Limit on all claims from same medical injury (except wrongful death) | Limit on all claims if wrongful death cases is filed with two or more beneficiaries | Total limit |
| 10/1/1996 | $530,000.00 | $795,000.00 | $1,325,000.00 |
| 10/1/1997 | $545,000.00 | $817,500.00 | $1,362,500.00 |
| 10/1/1998 | $560,000.00 | $840,000.00 | $1,400,000.00 |
| 10/1/1999 | $575,000.00 | $862,500.00 | $1,437,500.00 |
| 10/1/2000 | $590,000.00 | $885,000.00 | $1,475,000.00 |
| 10/1/2001 | $605,000.00 | $907,500.00 | $1,512,500.00 |
| 10/1/2002 | $620,000.00 | $930,000.00 | $1,550,000.00 |
| 10/1/2003 | $635,000.00 | $952,500.00 | $1,587,500.00 |
| 10/1/2004 | $650,000.00 | $975,000.00 | $1,625,000.00 |
| New Malpractice Cap | |||
| 1/1/2005 | $650,000.00 | $812,500.00 | $812,500.00 |
| 1/1/2006 | $650,000.00 | $812,500.00 | $812,500.00 |
| 1/1/2007 | $650,000.00 | $812,500.00 | $812,500.00 |
| 1/1/2008 | $650,000.00 | $812,500.00 | $812,500.00 |
| 1/1/2009 | $665,000.00 | $831,250.00 | $831,250.00 |
| 1/1/2010 | $680,000.00 | $850,000.00 | $850,000.00 |
| 1/1/2011 | $695,000.00 | $868,750.00 | $868,750.00 |
| 1/1/2012 | $710,000.00 | $887,500.00 | $887,500.00 |
| 1/1/2013 | $725,000.00 | $906,250.00 | $906,250.00 |
| 1/1/2014 | $740,000.00 | $925,000.00 | $925,000.00 |
| 1/1/2015 | $755,000.00 | $943,750.00 | $943,750.00 |
[see, www.millerandzois.com/maryland-medical-malpractice-cap]
[No attorney-client relationship is established with anyone merely through this abovereferenced blog and/or information. Always seek personal professional advice and consultation].
MARYLAND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WAREHOUSE
Periodic Payments of Damages
Maryland courts and arbitration panels are afforded the power to order that future damages be paid in the form of periodic payments, subject to adequate security [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-109 (1995)]. Upon the death of a claimant receiving periodic payments, the unpaid balance for future medical expenses reverts to the defendant. Id.
Collateral Source Rule
In Maryland, evidence of the claimant’s receipt of payments from collateral sources may not be admitted to reduce his damages [Schreiber v. Cherry Hill Construction Co., 105 Md. App. 462, 660 A.2d 970 (Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 340 Md. 500, 667 A.2d 341 (1995)].Pre-Judgment Interest on Tort Claims
Maryland law does not recognize pre-judgment interest on tort claims for personal injury [Lawhorne v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 343 Md. 111, 680 A.2d 518 (1996)].Patient Compensation Funds and Physician Insurance
Maryland does not have a patient compensation fund or a program of state-sponsored liability insurance for physicians.Immunities
Under Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-104 (Supp. 1997), the state has waived its sovereign immunity to the extent of $100,000 per claim. However, such immunity still applies with respect to punitive damages and pre-judgment interest [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(a) (Supp. 1997)]. A claimant must provide written notice of his claim within one year of the injury. If the claim is denied, a lawsuit must be filed within three years after the cause of action arises or the claim is barred [Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-106 (Supp. 1997)].The liability of any local government in Maryland is capped at $200,000 per claim and $500,000 per occurrence. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303 (Supp. 1997). Local governments are immune from liability for punitive damages. Id. The purchase of liability insurance does not waive the entity’s immunity [See Quecedo v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 590, 287 A.2d 257 (1972) (holding that in the absence of statute to the contrary, a county that maintains liability insurance does not waive its immunity)].
CHARLES WARE'S THREE (3) FAMOUS CLASS ACTION DISCRIMINATION CASES: BURGER KING, CAPITOL HILL POLICE, AND BLACK FARMERS
CHARLES WARE'S THREE (3) FAMOUS CLASS ACTION DISCRIMINATION CASES:
BURGER KING, CAPITOL HILL POLICE, AND BLACK FARMERS
Attorney Charles Ware is a founder and principal of the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland.
(1) BURGER KING FRANCHISEE CLASS ACTION:
HALL, ET AL. v. BURGER KING CORPORATION
Class Action Suit Filed: October 18, 1988, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C., subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Miami); Damages Demand: $500 Million; Plaintiffs: Twelve (12) named Plaintiffs (including Ms. Hall); Lead Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors; H. Russell Frisby; Franklin M. Lee, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (MBELDEF, Inc.)
_________________________________________________________________________________
Legal Issues: Antitrust violations and Discrimination alleged against Burger King Corporation by minority franchisees: examples include the relegation of black and other minority franchisees of BKC fast-food franchises to unprofitable locations in poor, urban neighborhoods, and reserving more profitable outlets for whites.
[The New York Times ("Federal Suit Accuses Burger King of Discrimination Against Blacks"), October 18, 1988; Associated Press (AP), 10-18-2012; www.nytimes.com/1988/10/18/US/federal-suit-accuses-burger-king-of-discrimination; The Washington Post, 10/18/2012; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 19, 1988].
Class Action Suit Filed: October 18, 1988, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C., subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Miami); Damages Demand: $500 Million; Plaintiffs: Twelve (12) named Plaintiffs (including Ms. Hall); Lead Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors; H. Russell Frisby; Franklin M. Lee, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (MBELDEF, Inc.)
_________________________________________________________________________________
Legal Issues: Antitrust violations and Discrimination alleged against Burger King Corporation by minority franchisees: examples include the relegation of black and other minority franchisees of BKC fast-food franchises to unprofitable locations in poor, urban neighborhoods, and reserving more profitable outlets for whites.
[The New York Times ("Federal Suit Accuses Burger King of Discrimination Against Blacks"), October 18, 1988; Associated Press (AP), 10-18-2012; www.nytimes.com/1988/10/18/US/federal-suit-accuses-burger-king-of-discrimination; The Washington Post, 10/18/2012; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 19, 1988].
(2) CAPITOL HILL POLICE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT:
BLACKMON-MALLOY, et al. v. UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE BOARD, Civil Docket Case # 1:01-cv-02221-EGS-JMF, U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C.; Case Filed: 10/29/2001; Jury Demanded; Damages Demand: $100,000,000.00; Lead Attorney for Plaintiff Class: Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Nature of Class Action Suit: Employment discrimination.
Judge Assigned: Judge Emmet G. Sullivan.
Magistrate Assigned: Magistrate John M. Facciola.
"You have, basically, a renegade police department up here, that's been operating under the protection of Congress" - Attorney Charles J. Ware, 10/29/2001.
[The New York Times, The Washington Post, Associated Press].
_________________________________________________________________________________
Nature of Class Action Suit: Employment discrimination.
Judge Assigned: Judge Emmet G. Sullivan.
Magistrate Assigned: Magistrate John M. Facciola.
"You have, basically, a renegade police department up here, that's been operating under the protection of Congress" - Attorney Charles J. Ware, 10/29/2001.
[The New York Times, The Washington Post, Associated Press].
(3) BLACK FARMERS CLASS ACTION CASE:
TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al. v. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary of the U.S Department of Agriculture, and CECIL BRWEINGTON, et al., v. MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Civil Class Action Cases Number 97-1978 (PLF) and Number 98-1693 (PLF); Filed: August 28, 1997, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; Case "Settled and Terminated": April 14, 1999; Motion for Reconsideration filed on February 3rd, 2005 in re the Court's January 2005 Opinion denying a previous motion by a group of Black Farmers to modify the Consent Decree, by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors.
1. Terms of the Consent Decree
Under the consent decree, an eligible recipient is an African American who (1) farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, (2) applied to USDA for farm credit or program benefits and believes that he or she was discriminated against by the USDA on the basis of race, and (3) made a complaint against the USDA on or before July 1, 1997. The consent decree set up a system for notice, claims submission, consideration, and review that involved a facilitator, arbitrator, adjudicator, and monitor, all with assigned responsibilities. The funds to pay the costs of the settlement (including legal fees) come from the Judgment Fund operated by the Department of the Treasury, not from USDA accounts or appropriations.
After the lawsuit was filed, Pigford requested blanket mediation to cover what was thought to be about 2,000 farmers who may have been discriminated against, but the U.S. Department of Justice opposed the mediation, saying that each case had to be investigated separately. As the case moved toward trial, the presiding judge certified as a class all black farmers who filed discrimination complaints against the USDA between 1983 and 1997.
The Pigford consent decree established a two-track dispute resolution mechanism for those seeking relief.
The most widely used option was called "Track A" which could provide a monetary settlement of $50,000 plus relief in the form of loan forgiveness and offsets of tax liability.
Track A claimants had to present substantial evidence (i.e., a reasonable basis for finding that discrimination happened) that:
This settlement was hastily approved on April 14, 1999, by Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
[see, "The Pigford Case: USDA Settlement of a Discrimination Suit by Black Farmers," Congressional Research Service, Tadlock Cowan (January 13, 2009); www.blackfarmercase.com; cnsnews.com/news/article/ "Thousands of Black Farmers File Claims in USDA Discrimination Settlement"; www.washingtonpost.com/02-19-2010/ "U.S. Approves Settlement for Black Farmers"; www.reuters.com/2010-02-18/"Black Farmers Win $1.25 billion in Discrimination Suit"]
1. Terms of the Consent Decree
Under the consent decree, an eligible recipient is an African American who (1) farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, (2) applied to USDA for farm credit or program benefits and believes that he or she was discriminated against by the USDA on the basis of race, and (3) made a complaint against the USDA on or before July 1, 1997. The consent decree set up a system for notice, claims submission, consideration, and review that involved a facilitator, arbitrator, adjudicator, and monitor, all with assigned responsibilities. The funds to pay the costs of the settlement (including legal fees) come from the Judgment Fund operated by the Department of the Treasury, not from USDA accounts or appropriations.
2. Case history
The lawsuit was filed in 1997 by Timothy Pigford, who was joined by 400 additional African-American farmer plaintiffs. Dan Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture, was the nominal defendant. The allegations were that the USDA treated black farmers unfairly when deciding to allocate price support loans, disaster payments, "farm ownership" loans, and operating loans, and that the USDA had failed to process subsequent complaints about racial discrimination.After the lawsuit was filed, Pigford requested blanket mediation to cover what was thought to be about 2,000 farmers who may have been discriminated against, but the U.S. Department of Justice opposed the mediation, saying that each case had to be investigated separately. As the case moved toward trial, the presiding judge certified as a class all black farmers who filed discrimination complaints against the USDA between 1983 and 1997.
The Pigford consent decree established a two-track dispute resolution mechanism for those seeking relief.
The most widely used option was called "Track A" which could provide a monetary settlement of $50,000 plus relief in the form of loan forgiveness and offsets of tax liability.
Track A claimants had to present substantial evidence (i.e., a reasonable basis for finding that discrimination happened) that:
- claimant owned or leased, or attempted to own or lease, farm land;
- claimant applied for a specific credit transaction at a USDA county office during the applicable period;
- the loan was denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, encumbered by restrictive conditions, or USDA failed to provide appropriate loan service, and such treatment was less favorable than that accorded specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers; and
- the USDA’s treatment of the loan application led to economic damage to the class member.
This settlement was hastily approved on April 14, 1999, by Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
[see, "The Pigford Case: USDA Settlement of a Discrimination Suit by Black Farmers," Congressional Research Service, Tadlock Cowan (January 13, 2009); www.blackfarmercase.com; cnsnews.com/news/article/ "Thousands of Black Farmers File Claims in USDA Discrimination Settlement"; www.washingtonpost.com/02-19-2010/ "U.S. Approves Settlement for Black Farmers"; www.reuters.com/2010-02-18/"Black Farmers Win $1.25 billion in Discrimination Suit"]
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
BLACK FARMERS CLASS ACTION CASE:
TIMOTHY PIGFORD, et al. v. ANN VENEMAN, Secretary of the U.S Department of Agriculture, and CECIL BRWEINGTON, et al., v. MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Civil Class Action Cases Number 97-1978 (PLF) and Number 98-1693 (PLF); Filed: August 28, 1997, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; Case "Settled and Terminated": April 14, 1999; Motion for Reconsideration filed on February 3rd, 2005 in re the Court's January 2005 Opinion denying a previous motion by a group of Black Farmers to modify the Consent Decree, by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors.
1. Terms of the Consent Decree
Under the consent decree, an eligible recipient is an African American who (1) farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, (2) applied to USDA for farm credit or program benefits and believes that he or she was discriminated against by the USDA on the basis of race, and (3) made a complaint against the USDA on or before July 1, 1997. The consent decree set up a system for notice, claims submission, consideration, and review that involved a facilitator, arbitrator, adjudicator, and monitor, all with assigned responsibilities. The funds to pay the costs of the settlement (including legal fees) come from the Judgment Fund operated by the Department of the Treasury, not from USDA accounts or appropriations.
After the lawsuit was filed, Pigford requested blanket mediation to cover what was thought to be about 2,000 farmers who may have been discriminated against, but the U.S. Department of Justice opposed the mediation, saying that each case had to be investigated separately. As the case moved toward trial, the presiding judge certified as a class all black farmers who filed discrimination complaints against the USDA between 1983 and 1997.
The Pigford consent decree established a two-track dispute resolution mechanism for those seeking relief.
The most widely used option was called "Track A" which could provide a monetary settlement of $50,000 plus relief in the form of loan forgiveness and offsets of tax liability.
Track A claimants had to present substantial evidence (i.e., a reasonable basis for finding that discrimination happened) that:
This settlement was hastily approved on April 14, 1999, by Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
[see, "The Pigford Case: USDA Settlement of a Discrimination Suit by Black Farmers," Congressional Research Service, Tadlock Cowan (January 13, 2009); www.blackfarmercase.com; cnsnews.com/news/article/ "Thousands of Black Farmers File Claims in USDA Discrimination Settlement"; www.washingtonpost.com/02-19-2010/ "U.S. Approves Settlement for Black Farmers"; www.reuters.com/2010-02-18/"Black Farmers Win $1.25 billion in Discrimination Suit"]
1. Terms of the Consent Decree
Under the consent decree, an eligible recipient is an African American who (1) farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981, and December 31, 1996, (2) applied to USDA for farm credit or program benefits and believes that he or she was discriminated against by the USDA on the basis of race, and (3) made a complaint against the USDA on or before July 1, 1997. The consent decree set up a system for notice, claims submission, consideration, and review that involved a facilitator, arbitrator, adjudicator, and monitor, all with assigned responsibilities. The funds to pay the costs of the settlement (including legal fees) come from the Judgment Fund operated by the Department of the Treasury, not from USDA accounts or appropriations.
2. Case history
The lawsuit was filed in 1997 by Timothy Pigford, who was joined by 400 additional African-American farmer plaintiffs. Dan Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture, was the nominal defendant. The allegations were that the USDA treated black farmers unfairly when deciding to allocate price support loans, disaster payments, "farm ownership" loans, and operating loans, and that the USDA had failed to process subsequent complaints about racial discrimination.After the lawsuit was filed, Pigford requested blanket mediation to cover what was thought to be about 2,000 farmers who may have been discriminated against, but the U.S. Department of Justice opposed the mediation, saying that each case had to be investigated separately. As the case moved toward trial, the presiding judge certified as a class all black farmers who filed discrimination complaints against the USDA between 1983 and 1997.
The Pigford consent decree established a two-track dispute resolution mechanism for those seeking relief.
The most widely used option was called "Track A" which could provide a monetary settlement of $50,000 plus relief in the form of loan forgiveness and offsets of tax liability.
Track A claimants had to present substantial evidence (i.e., a reasonable basis for finding that discrimination happened) that:
- claimant owned or leased, or attempted to own or lease, farm land;
- claimant applied for a specific credit transaction at a USDA county office during the applicable period;
- the loan was denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested, encumbered by restrictive conditions, or USDA failed to provide appropriate loan service, and such treatment was less favorable than that accorded specifically identified, similarly situated white farmers; and
- the USDA’s treatment of the loan application led to economic damage to the class member.
This settlement was hastily approved on April 14, 1999, by Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
[see, "The Pigford Case: USDA Settlement of a Discrimination Suit by Black Farmers," Congressional Research Service, Tadlock Cowan (January 13, 2009); www.blackfarmercase.com; cnsnews.com/news/article/ "Thousands of Black Farmers File Claims in USDA Discrimination Settlement"; www.washingtonpost.com/02-19-2010/ "U.S. Approves Settlement for Black Farmers"; www.reuters.com/2010-02-18/"Black Farmers Win $1.25 billion in Discrimination Suit"]
BURGER KING FRANCHISEE CLASS ACTION:
HALL, ET AL. v. BURGER KING CORPORATION
Class Action Suit Filed: October 18, 1988, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C., subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Miami); Damages Demand: $500 Million; Plaintiffs: Twelve (12) named Plaintiffs (including Ms. Hall); Lead Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors; H. Russell Frisby; Franklin M. Lee, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (MBELDEF, Inc.)
_________________________________________________________________________________
Legal Issues: Antitrust violations and Discrimination alleged against Burger King Corporation by minority franchisees: examples include the relegation of black and other minority franchisees of BKC fast-food franchises to unprofitable locations in poor, urban neighborhoods, and reserving more profitable outlets for whites.
[The New York Times ("Federal Suit Accuses Burger King of Discrimination Against Blacks"), October 18, 1988; Associated Press (AP), 10-18-2012; www.nytimes.com/1988/10/18/US/federal-suit-accuses-burger-king-of-discrimination; The Washington Post, 10/18/2012; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 19, 1988].
Class Action Suit Filed: October 18, 1988, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C., subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Miami); Damages Demand: $500 Million; Plaintiffs: Twelve (12) named Plaintiffs (including Ms. Hall); Lead Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors; H. Russell Frisby; Franklin M. Lee, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (MBELDEF, Inc.)
_________________________________________________________________________________
Legal Issues: Antitrust violations and Discrimination alleged against Burger King Corporation by minority franchisees: examples include the relegation of black and other minority franchisees of BKC fast-food franchises to unprofitable locations in poor, urban neighborhoods, and reserving more profitable outlets for whites.
[The New York Times ("Federal Suit Accuses Burger King of Discrimination Against Blacks"), October 18, 1988; Associated Press (AP), 10-18-2012; www.nytimes.com/1988/10/18/US/federal-suit-accuses-burger-king-of-discrimination; The Washington Post, 10/18/2012; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 19, 1988].
"DR. PEDOPHILE'S" SERIAL CHILD SEX ABUSE CASE ENDS: $123,000,000 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Tuesday, November 20, 2012.
An update from the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
It's official! A serial child molester class action case involving Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland children settles.
A Wilmington, Delaware Superior Court trial judge has approved a $123,000,000 class action settlement for more than 900 victims of child sex abuse over a 15-year reign of terror and abuse by pediatrician Dr. Earl Bradley in Sussex County.
Serial child molester Dr. Bradley was convicted in August 2011 of multiple criminal counts of child rape involving his young patients (many were infants), and he was sentenced to 14 life terms plus 164 years of incarceration.
The 54-page settlement order appoints a mediator to distribute the funds to victims. The claims will be evaluated by the mediator and separated into five (5) categories based upon their severity. As stated previously, many of the victims were infants (the youngest victims were reported to be no older than 3 months of age).
These horrendous cases against Bradley were made easier to prove because of the pediatrician's meticulous documentation of his crimes on videotapes he kept in his office. These recordings were discovered by the police during their criminal investigation.
[www.upi.com/Top News/ 2012-11-20/ "Judge OKs $123 million for sex victims"; "Dr. Pedophile", Worldnews.com (article, 2010-02-27); Bradley v. State, Delaware Supreme Court, No. 467, 2011 (Sept. 6, 2012); www.courierpostonline.com/ 2012-11-19/ "Document: Dr. Earl Bradley Settlement Opinion; www.usatoday.com/ 2012/11/19/ $123 M Settlement Approved"]
An update from the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
It's official! A serial child molester class action case involving Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland children settles.
A Wilmington, Delaware Superior Court trial judge has approved a $123,000,000 class action settlement for more than 900 victims of child sex abuse over a 15-year reign of terror and abuse by pediatrician Dr. Earl Bradley in Sussex County.
Serial child molester Dr. Bradley was convicted in August 2011 of multiple criminal counts of child rape involving his young patients (many were infants), and he was sentenced to 14 life terms plus 164 years of incarceration.
The 54-page settlement order appoints a mediator to distribute the funds to victims. The claims will be evaluated by the mediator and separated into five (5) categories based upon their severity. As stated previously, many of the victims were infants (the youngest victims were reported to be no older than 3 months of age).
These horrendous cases against Bradley were made easier to prove because of the pediatrician's meticulous documentation of his crimes on videotapes he kept in his office. These recordings were discovered by the police during their criminal investigation.
[www.upi.com/Top News/ 2012-11-20/ "Judge OKs $123 million for sex victims"; "Dr. Pedophile", Worldnews.com (article, 2010-02-27); Bradley v. State, Delaware Supreme Court, No. 467, 2011 (Sept. 6, 2012); www.courierpostonline.com/ 2012-11-19/ "Document: Dr. Earl Bradley Settlement Opinion; www.usatoday.com/ 2012/11/19/ $123 M Settlement Approved"]
CAPITOL HILL POLICE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT:
BLACKMON-MALLOY, et al. v. UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE BOARD, Civil Docket Case # 1:01-cv-02221-EGS-JMF, U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C.; Case Filed: 10/29/2001; Jury Demanded; Damages Demand: $100,000,000.00; Lead Attorney for Plaintiff Class: Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Nature of Class Action Suit: Employment discrimination.
Judge Assigned: Judge Emmet G. Sullivan.
Magistrate Assigned: Magistrate John M. Facciola.
"You have, basically, a renegade police department up here, that's been operating under the protection of Congress" - Attorney Charles J. Ware, 10/29/2001.
[The New York Times, The Washington Post, Associated Press].
_________________________________________________________________________________
Nature of Class Action Suit: Employment discrimination.
Judge Assigned: Judge Emmet G. Sullivan.
Magistrate Assigned: Magistrate John M. Facciola.
"You have, basically, a renegade police department up here, that's been operating under the protection of Congress" - Attorney Charles J. Ware, 10/29/2001.
[The New York Times, The Washington Post, Associated Press].
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
"NON-PROFIT BOARDS: THE LAWYER'S ROLE AS MEMBER", by Charles Jerome Ware
The law offices of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, is a national general practice law firm headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland.
The firm's motto is: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
After several years of serving on non-profit boards here in Maryland, my tenure has ended and I can now look back as an attorney board member and, hopefully, provide some guidance to other lawyers who may be considering or beginning service on non-profit boards.
Though it is a very important community activity, service on non-profit boards is not without risk for all boardmembers --- including lawyer boardmembers.
1. Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Coverage
Do not become a member of a non-profit board of any type without sufficient Directors and Officers (D&O) liability coverage. Be very aware of the organization board's (i) amounts and (ii) limits of coverage, and (iii) types of acts (errors and omissions) coverage.
2. Lawyer's Professional Liability Coverage
For lawyer-directors (lawyer-boardmembers), professional malpractice insurance coverage is always a background issue. Several issues in this regard are important.
Are there any "conflicts of interest" issues that may arise with the lawyer's membership on the board?
The lawyer's firm's database should process the lawyer's involvement as a director or boardmember in order to identify and analyze the current existence of and the potential for conflict issues. A lawyer's service on a non-profit board of directors might preclude the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm from being a legal opponent (adverse) to the organization.
[see, Berry v. Saline Memorial Hospital, 907 S.W. 2d736 (Arkansas 1995)]
4. Considerations for Lawyers Prior to Board Membership
Prior to agreeing to serve as a member, director or officer on the board of a nonprofit organization, I recommend the lawyer should:
Directors of nonprofit organizations generally have two main fiduciary duties: (i) the duty of care and (ii) duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires the director to act with the care a person in a like position would reasonably believe to be appropriate under similar circumstances. The duty of loyalty requires the director to act in good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the organization. The duty of loyalty also covers conflict of interest situations.
The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (3d ed.), Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, and many states' nonprofit statutes provide a process for handling conflict of interest situations, which generally requires, at a minimum, the disclosure of a potential conflict and the nonparticipation of the conflicted director in the action taken by the organization with regard to the conflict situation.
In terms of the ethical obligations imposed on lawyers in their representation of clients, Rule 1.7 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provides that a lawyer may not represent a client if such representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. Some key concepts with this particular rule are the duty of loyalty a lawyer has to the client and the need for the lawyer to be able to exercise independent judgment.
[americanbar.org/businesslaw/ "Lawyers' Service on Nonprofit Boards", Willard L. Boyd III, ABA, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Nov./Dec. 200); www.boardsource.org/KnowledgeCenter/NonprofitBoards; www.cof.org/files/Documents/ Governing Boards/ Ocober 2006]
The firm's motto is: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
After several years of serving on non-profit boards here in Maryland, my tenure has ended and I can now look back as an attorney board member and, hopefully, provide some guidance to other lawyers who may be considering or beginning service on non-profit boards.
Though it is a very important community activity, service on non-profit boards is not without risk for all boardmembers --- including lawyer boardmembers.
1. Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Coverage
Do not become a member of a non-profit board of any type without sufficient Directors and Officers (D&O) liability coverage. Be very aware of the organization board's (i) amounts and (ii) limits of coverage, and (iii) types of acts (errors and omissions) coverage.
2. Lawyer's Professional Liability Coverage
For lawyer-directors (lawyer-boardmembers), professional malpractice insurance coverage is always a background issue. Several issues in this regard are important.
- Will the professional liability coverage cover legal services provided to a non-profit organization on a pro bono basis?
- Are there any limitations in the coverage if the lawyer is also a director of the board?
Are there any "conflicts of interest" issues that may arise with the lawyer's membership on the board?
The lawyer's firm's database should process the lawyer's involvement as a director or boardmember in order to identify and analyze the current existence of and the potential for conflict issues. A lawyer's service on a non-profit board of directors might preclude the lawyer or the lawyer's law firm from being a legal opponent (adverse) to the organization.
[see, Berry v. Saline Memorial Hospital, 907 S.W. 2d736 (Arkansas 1995)]
4. Considerations for Lawyers Prior to Board Membership
Prior to agreeing to serve as a member, director or officer on the board of a nonprofit organization, I recommend the lawyer should:
- Review the expectations of the organization for the lawyer/director concerning legal representation. For example, does another law firm provide legal representation for the non-profit?
- Understand what (if any) type of legal services the non-profit will expect of the lawyer/director or his/her law firms.
- Determine whether the non-profit will expect the lawyer/director to provide it with regular legal services and, if so, if there is a likelihood that conflicts will arise. By the way, to the extent the lawyer will be regularly providing legal services and conflicts of interest are likely to arise, the lawyer should seriously consider not serving on the board.
- Review the organization's governance documents and applicable state nonprofit law. What do the articles, bylaws, and applicable state nonprofit statute provide with regard to liability, immunity, indemnification, and conflicts of interest?
Directors of nonprofit organizations generally have two main fiduciary duties: (i) the duty of care and (ii) duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires the director to act with the care a person in a like position would reasonably believe to be appropriate under similar circumstances. The duty of loyalty requires the director to act in good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the organization. The duty of loyalty also covers conflict of interest situations.
The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (3d ed.), Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, and many states' nonprofit statutes provide a process for handling conflict of interest situations, which generally requires, at a minimum, the disclosure of a potential conflict and the nonparticipation of the conflicted director in the action taken by the organization with regard to the conflict situation.
In terms of the ethical obligations imposed on lawyers in their representation of clients, Rule 1.7 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provides that a lawyer may not represent a client if such representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. Some key concepts with this particular rule are the duty of loyalty a lawyer has to the client and the need for the lawyer to be able to exercise independent judgment.
[americanbar.org/businesslaw/ "Lawyers' Service on Nonprofit Boards", Willard L. Boyd III, ABA, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Nov./Dec. 200); www.boardsource.org/KnowledgeCenter/NonprofitBoards; www.cof.org/files/Documents/ Governing Boards/ Ocober 2006]
Monday, November 19, 2012
CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY: SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS NOT CONSIDERED "INCOME" FOR DEBTOR:
In Re Ragos, No. 11-31046, 5th Cir (2012)
Friday, November 16, 2012, Columbia, Howard County, Maryland.
This blog is presented as a public service by the national general practice law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors. The firm is headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland, and its motto is: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
Decision: Social security benefits are not included in the projected disposable income calculation, and therefore are not required to be disclosed in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides bankruptcy protection to individuals with regular income whose debts fall within statutory limits. Unlike bankruptcy debtors who file under Chapter 7 and must liquidate their assets, Chapter 13 debtors are permitted to keep their property subject to a court-approved plan under which they agree to pay creditors out of their future income.
Benjamin and Stella Ragos (“Debtors”) voluntarily filed a joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on February 22, 2011. On schedule I (Current Income of Individual Debtors), Debtors itemized their monthly income, including a $200.00 portion of their monthly social security benefits. Debtors' actual monthly receipt of social security benefits totals $1,854.00.
Pursuant to a Chapter 13 reorganization, the Debtors filed a proposed payment plan. Under the terms of the plan, creditors would receive all of Debtors' declared monthly net income. However, the Debtors would retain the undeclared balance of their social security benefits, $1,654.00 each month.
S.J. Beaulieu, Jr., the Chapter 13 Trustee (“Trustee”), objected to confirmation of the Debtors' plan because Debtors did not dedicate 100% of their social security income to the plan for payment to creditors. Trustee additionally argued that Debtors' willful failure to commit their social security income to the repayment of creditors indicated that their plan had not been proposed in good faith.
After a hearing, the bankruptcy judge rejected both of Trustee's arguments. The bankruptcy court based its ruling primarily on the language of provisions of both the Bankruptcy Code and the Social Security Act, reflecting a congressional intent to exclude social security benefits in calculating projected disposable income. The bankruptcy court's order was certified for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) and the New Orleans-based 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals granted the motion for appeal of the order.
This same issue involving social security benefits is also before the 4th Circuit and is slowly making its way to the 6th Circuit which includes Michigan.
[In the Matter of: Benjamin Ragos; Stella Cannon Ragos (Debtors); S.J. Beaulieu, Jr. (Appelant) v. Benjamin Ragos and Stella Cannon Ragos (Appellees), No. 11-31046, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (November 12, 2012); U.S. Fifth Circuit, blogs.findlaw.com/fifth-circuit/2012-12-11/ Social Security Benefits Aren't Disposable Income]
BRIBERY LAW: GUIDANCE FOR "DOs" AND "DON'Ts" FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
This information is presented as a public service by the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorney and Counsellors: "Here to make a difference."
Wednesday, November 14th, 2012, Washington, D.C.
The Federal Government today, by way of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), issued its long-awaited 120-page document providing guidance about which practices might place American corporations in violation of the far-reaching Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA") 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-1, et seq., --- America's premier antibribery law.
The new SEC and DOJ document, titled "A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act", seeks to provide a detailed analysis of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and closely examines the DOJ and SEC approaches to FCPA enforcement.
The new guide is available online at: www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml or www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.
The new FCPA guide attempts to address concerns and complaints from American companies that ambiguities in the FCPA forces them to avoid doing business in s-called "high-risk" countries and spend millions of dollars investigations themselves to insure that they are in compliance.
As expected, for the most part, the new guide simply urges the use of commonsense. For example:
These two examples above, should be no surprises to the reader.
U.S.
[www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa; online.wsj.com/article/ "FCPAMcChesney, Univ. of Harvard Press: Cambridge, Mass. (1997); "Bribes", John Thomas Noonan, MacMillan: New York (1984); "Bribery Law Dos and Don'ts", Palazzolo and Matthews, The Wall Street Jounral, 11/15/2012, pp. B1-2]
Wednesday, November 14th, 2012, Washington, D.C.
The Federal Government today, by way of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), issued its long-awaited 120-page document providing guidance about which practices might place American corporations in violation of the far-reaching Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA") 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-1, et seq., --- America's premier antibribery law.
The new SEC and DOJ document, titled "A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act", seeks to provide a detailed analysis of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and closely examines the DOJ and SEC approaches to FCPA enforcement.
The new guide is available online at: www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml or www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.
The new FCPA guide attempts to address concerns and complaints from American companies that ambiguities in the FCPA forces them to avoid doing business in s-called "high-risk" countries and spend millions of dollars investigations themselves to insure that they are in compliance.
As expected, for the most part, the new guide simply urges the use of commonsense. For example:
-Buying a cup of coffee for an official to seal a business deal overseas is probably insufficient evidence of a corrupt intent; however, funding a $15,000 birthday trip for a government official from a foreign country that includes visits to wineries and dinners probably is sufficient evidence to establish a corrupt intent.
-Paying a modest taxi fare for an official to assist in your business is probably acceptable; but spending $20,000 on sightseeing, dinners, drinks and other entertainment for a government official is probably unacceptable under the FCPA guidelines.
These two examples above, should be no surprises to the reader.
The 1988 Trade Act directed the Attorney General to provide guidance concerning the Department of Justice's enforcement policy with respect to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ("FCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq., to potential exporters and small businesses that are unable to obtain specialized counsel on issues related to the FCPA. The guidance is limited to responses to requests under the Department of Justice's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure (described below at p. 10) and to general explanations of compliance responsibilities and potential liabilities under the FCPA. This brochure constitutes the Department of Justice's general explanation of the FCPA.
[www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa; online.wsj.com/article/ "FCPAMcChesney, Univ. of Harvard Press: Cambridge, Mass. (1997); "Bribes", John Thomas Noonan, MacMillan: New York (1984); "Bribery Law Dos and Don'ts", Palazzolo and Matthews, The Wall Street Jounral, 11/15/2012, pp. B1-2]
Thursday, November 15, 2012
SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC HOLDER: Attack On The Voting Rights Act
This legal blog is presented as a public service by the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973) is a landmark piece of federal legislation that outlawed discriminatory voting practices in the United States that had been responsible for widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans.
These discriminatory practices were, and continue to be, particularly prevalent in the southern states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia; the western states of California, Alaska, and Arizona; and parts of the states of New York, Michigan, New Hampshire and South Dakota.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 echoes the language of the 15th Amendment and prohibits states from imposing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Specifically, Congress intended the Act to outlaw the practice of requiring otherwise qualified voters to pass literacy tests in order to register to vote, a principal means by which Southern states had prevented African Americans from exercising the franchise. The Act was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had earlier signed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.
The Act established extensive federal oversight of elections administration, providing that states with a history of discriminatory voting practices (so-called "covered jurisdictions") could not implement any change affecting voting without first obtaining the approval of the Department of Justice, a process known as preclearance. These enforcement provisions applied to states and political subdivisions (mostly in the South) that had used a "device" to limit voting and in which less than 50 percent of the population was registered to vote in 1964. The Act has been renewed and amended by Congress four times, the most recent being a 25-year extension signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2006.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is now again under attack, and it will be reviewed this term (OT 2012) by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Docket Number 12-96, from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
This latest saga in the assault on the Act started in April 2010 when Shelby County, Alabama (a largely white suburb of Birmingham) filed suit in federal court in Washington, DC asking that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act be declared unconstitutional [Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 1:10-cv-00651 (D.D.C.)]. The county is claiming that Congress did not have the constitutional authority, in 2006, to reauthorize Section 5 for another 25 years.
Section 5 (Preclearance)
Section 5 of the Act requires that the United States Department of Justice, through an administrative procedure, or a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, through a declaratory judgment action "preclear" any attempt to change “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting..." in any "covered jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation to the words "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting" in Allen v. State Board of Election, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). A covered jurisdiction that seeks to obtain Section 5 Preclearance, either from the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, must demonstrate that a proposed voting change does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of discriminating based on race or color. In some cases, they must also show that the proposed change does not have the purpose or effect of discriminating against a "language minority group." Membership in a language minority group includes "persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage."
The burden of proof under current Section 5 jurisprudence is on the covered jurisdiction to establish that the proposed change does not have a retrogressive purpose.
Covered jurisdictions may not implement voting changes without federal Preclearance. The Justice Department has 60 days to respond to a request for a voting change. If the Justice Department or federal court rejects a request for Preclearance, the jurisdiction may continue the prior voting practice or may adopt a substitute and seek Preclearance for it. If the jurisdiction implements a voting change before the Justice Department denies Preclearance in contravention of the Act, the jurisdiction must return to the pre-existing practice or enact a different change.
In essence, the key issue the Supreme Court will be revisiting in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder is:
Issue: Whether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.
[www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ Shelby County v. Holder; campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/ Is the Voting Rights Act Doomed?; "United States Department of Justice - Voting Rights Act of 1965". U.S. Department of Justice. 2006-03-20. http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/faq.htm. Retrieved 2008-08-29; "The Voting Rights Act of 1965". United States Department of Justice. http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_b.php. Retrieved 2008-08-29;"The Voting Rights Act of 1965". U.S. National Archives. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=100&page=transcript. Retrieved 2008-08-29; "Our Documents - Civil Rights Act (1964)". United States Department of Justice. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=97. Retrieved 2010-07-28; "About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act". U.S. Department of Justice.; http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.php. Retrieved 2010-07-28;"Bush signs Voting Rights Act extension: Historic 1965 law renewed for 25 years". Associated Press. NBC News. July 27, 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14059113/. Retrieved 2008-08-29.]
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973) is a landmark piece of federal legislation that outlawed discriminatory voting practices in the United States that had been responsible for widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans.
These discriminatory practices were, and continue to be, particularly prevalent in the southern states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia; the western states of California, Alaska, and Arizona; and parts of the states of New York, Michigan, New Hampshire and South Dakota.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 echoes the language of the 15th Amendment and prohibits states from imposing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Specifically, Congress intended the Act to outlaw the practice of requiring otherwise qualified voters to pass literacy tests in order to register to vote, a principal means by which Southern states had prevented African Americans from exercising the franchise. The Act was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had earlier signed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.
The Act established extensive federal oversight of elections administration, providing that states with a history of discriminatory voting practices (so-called "covered jurisdictions") could not implement any change affecting voting without first obtaining the approval of the Department of Justice, a process known as preclearance. These enforcement provisions applied to states and political subdivisions (mostly in the South) that had used a "device" to limit voting and in which less than 50 percent of the population was registered to vote in 1964. The Act has been renewed and amended by Congress four times, the most recent being a 25-year extension signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2006.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is now again under attack, and it will be reviewed this term (OT 2012) by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Docket Number 12-96, from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
This latest saga in the assault on the Act started in April 2010 when Shelby County, Alabama (a largely white suburb of Birmingham) filed suit in federal court in Washington, DC asking that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act be declared unconstitutional [Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 1:10-cv-00651 (D.D.C.)]. The county is claiming that Congress did not have the constitutional authority, in 2006, to reauthorize Section 5 for another 25 years.
Section 5 (Preclearance)
Section 5 of the Act requires that the United States Department of Justice, through an administrative procedure, or a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, through a declaratory judgment action "preclear" any attempt to change “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting..." in any "covered jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation to the words "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting" in Allen v. State Board of Election, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). A covered jurisdiction that seeks to obtain Section 5 Preclearance, either from the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, must demonstrate that a proposed voting change does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of discriminating based on race or color. In some cases, they must also show that the proposed change does not have the purpose or effect of discriminating against a "language minority group." Membership in a language minority group includes "persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage."
The burden of proof under current Section 5 jurisprudence is on the covered jurisdiction to establish that the proposed change does not have a retrogressive purpose.
Covered jurisdictions may not implement voting changes without federal Preclearance. The Justice Department has 60 days to respond to a request for a voting change. If the Justice Department or federal court rejects a request for Preclearance, the jurisdiction may continue the prior voting practice or may adopt a substitute and seek Preclearance for it. If the jurisdiction implements a voting change before the Justice Department denies Preclearance in contravention of the Act, the jurisdiction must return to the pre-existing practice or enact a different change.
On September 21, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act against Shelby County's challenge. The Court held that Congress acted appropriately when it reauthorized the preclearance requirement of Section 5 in 2006. The opinion can be found here. An analysis of this opinion can be found here.
On May 18, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court ruling, by a vote of two to one. The court summarized its decision as follows: “Congress drew reasonable conclusions from the extensive evidence it gathered and acted pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which entrust Congress with ensuring that the right to vote—surely among the most important guarantees of political liberty in the Constitution—is not abridged on account of race. In this context, we owe much deference to the considered judgment of the People's elected representatives.” The opinion can be found here.
Shelby County has asked the Supreme Court to hear the case. Our opposition to that request can be found here.
In essence, the key issue the Supreme Court will be revisiting in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder is:
Issue: Whether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.
[www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ Shelby County v. Holder; campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/ Is the Voting Rights Act Doomed?; "United States Department of Justice - Voting Rights Act of 1965". U.S. Department of Justice. 2006-03-20. http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/faq.htm. Retrieved 2008-08-29; "The Voting Rights Act of 1965". United States Department of Justice. http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_b.php. Retrieved 2008-08-29;"The Voting Rights Act of 1965". U.S. National Archives. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=100&page=transcript. Retrieved 2008-08-29; "Our Documents - Civil Rights Act (1964)". United States Department of Justice. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=97. Retrieved 2010-07-28; "About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act". U.S. Department of Justice.; http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.php. Retrieved 2010-07-28;"Bush signs Voting Rights Act extension: Historic 1965 law renewed for 25 years". Associated Press. NBC News. July 27, 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14059113/. Retrieved 2008-08-29.]
SUPER prosedyreadvokat JEROME CHARLES WARE DEFENSE VINNER!
Utdrag fra artikkel av førsteamanuensis direktør Jacqueline E. Burrell, Howard County (Maryland) Times og The Baltimore (Maryland) Sun, 06/08/1989:
Super Trial Advokat Charles Ware har blitt tildelt den første "Charles Hamilton Houston VENTER AWARD for forsvar" i USA
Den prestisjetunge prisen ble overrakt av amerikansk kongressmedlem Parren J. Ware Mitchell på middag MBELDEF kjent, årlig Inc. i Washington, DC.
Super Trial Advokat Charles Ware har blitt tildelt den første "Charles Hamilton Houston VENTER AWARD for forsvar" i USA
Den prestisjetunge prisen ble overrakt av amerikansk kongressmedlem Parren J. Ware Mitchell på middag MBELDEF kjent, årlig Inc. i Washington, DC.
SUPER advocat litigant CHARLES JEROME WARE GUANYA PREMI DEFENSA LEGAL!
Extret de l'article de director adjunt Jacqueline E. Burrell, El Comtat de Howard (Maryland) Times i The Baltimore (Maryland) Sun, 1989.08.06:
Súper Advocat litigant Charles Ware ha estat guardonat amb el primer "CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AWARD PER DEFENSA LEGAL PENDENT" als EUA
El prestigiós premi va ser presentat pel Congressista dels EUA Ware Parren J. Mitchell en el sopar de renom MBELDEF, Inc anual a Washington, DC.
Súper Advocat litigant Charles Ware ha estat guardonat amb el primer "CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AWARD PER DEFENSA LEGAL PENDENT" als EUA
El prestigiós premi va ser presentat pel Congressista dels EUA Ware Parren J. Mitchell en el sopar de renom MBELDEF, Inc anual a Washington, DC.
SUPER abogado litigante CHARLES JEROME WARE GANA PREMIO DEFENSA LEGAL!!!
Extraído del artículo de director adjunto Jacqueline E. Burrell, El Condado de Howard (Maryland) Times y The Baltimore (Maryland) Sun, 06/08/1989:
Súper Abogado Litigante Charles Ware ha sido galardonado con el primer "CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AWARD PARA DEFENSA LEGAL PENDIENTE" en los EE.UU.
El prestigioso premio fue presentado por el Congresista de los EE.UU. Ware Parren J. Mitchell en la cena de renombre MBELDEF, Inc. anual en Washington, DC.
Súper Abogado Litigante Charles Ware ha sido galardonado con el primer "CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AWARD PARA DEFENSA LEGAL PENDIENTE" en los EE.UU.
El prestigioso premio fue presentado por el Congresista de los EE.UU. Ware Parren J. Mitchell en la cena de renombre MBELDEF, Inc. anual en Washington, DC.
Wednesday, November 14, 2012
PSYCHOLOGIST MALPRACTICE OR NEGLIGENCE: A $16,500,000.00 VERDICT!
The public relies on psychologists, psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to help at our most vulnerable times in life. Sometimes, however, this reliance becomes misplaced. No professional is perfect. Negligence does happen. Even boundary violations occur.
The national law offices of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, provide capable, competent and experienced attorneys to handle psychologist malpractice or negligence claims, patient abuse allegations, and boundary violations --- all of which can have disastrous consequences on the patient.
"Above all, do no harm." (Hippocratic Oath, 400 B.C.)
$16,500,000 VERDICT: Psychology Malpractice or Negligence - Patient accuses psychologist of implanting memories of rape and abuse by satanic cult during treatment - Pain and suffering damages.
In this case, a woman sued her psychologist, and also her ex-husband who worked in the psychologist’s office, for implanting memories of abuse by a satanic cult during CO2 treatment (carbon dioxide treatment for panic attacks). The ex-husband settled. The defendant psychologist denied wrongdoing, insisting that the dangerous memories were "real" repressed ones.
The plaintiff sought treatment from the State College (Pennsylvania) office of the defendant, a licensed psychologist. The plaintiff’s husband was employed at that office at the time. For four years thereafter, the plaintiff underwent treatment including hypnosis and CO2 (carbon dioxide) therapy under the supervision of the defendant.
CO2 treatment involved having a mask placed over the plaintiff’s face while she breathed in oxygen and CO2 until unconscious. It was during the hypnosis and the CO2-induced unconsciousness that the plaintiff underwent her treatment by the doctor, in sessions lasting two to eight hours.
It was during this treatment, the plaintiff alleged, that the defendant implanted memories of satanic ritual abuse in her mind, as well as memories of sexual abuse at the hands of her family. The plaintiff began experiencing flashbacks and nightmares that the defendant asserted were "repressed memories."
After ceasing CO2 treatments for health reasons, the plaintiff began to doubt the authenticity of the flashbacks and their relationship with the treatment, and contacted the police.
The plaintiff filed suit in Center County, Pennsylvania for medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress, naming both the doctor and her ex-husband as defendants.
She sought recovery for mental anguish and other non-economic damages.
The defendant ex-husband settled with the plaintiff.
The defendant doctor’s counsel was provided by his insurer until six months prior to trial.
The defendant doctor refused to settle, dismissed the insurance attorney and represented himself pro se thereafter. The defendant also filed a $3 million against the plaintiff for defamation.
The plaintiff asserted that the defendant psychologist had a penchant for a theory of satanic cult abuse, multiple personality disorder and repressed memories. The defendant testified at trial to having had 11 prior patients who discussed under hypnosis claims similar to the plaintiff’s flashbacks. The plaintiff asserted that these "memories" were implanted by the doctor during therapy sessions. She described her treatment with the defendant, beginning with two hour "mega-sessions" of hypnosis, which in turn led to CO2 treatments, in which she breathed CO2 from a mask until losing consciousness. She underwent this treatment for three and a-half years, multiple times a day.
The plaintiff stated that she had a normal family life, asserting that the flashbacks were not genuine or recoverable memories. She further argued that she had been forced to undergo the experience of sexual assaults repeatedly during her hundreds of sessions with the doctor. She also cited the end of her marriage and alienation from her family due to the experience. Finally, the plaintiff asserted that she had suffered brain damage as a result of the extensive use of CO2.
Testifying for the plaintiff were Dr. Mary Margaret Hart, a psychologist, and Dr. Judy Zarit, a neuropsychologist, as well as the plaintiff’s treating physicians.
The defendant psychologist asserted at trial that the plaintiff had a long history of physical and emotional pain, and that she did suffer childhood abuse, including abuse based in a satanic cult in State College, Pennsylvania. The defendant called Kimberly June, a former State College therapist, who testified to having treated two separate patients for similar cult abuse in Center County.
Therapist June testified via telephone that the cult operated in the 1960s, and included doctors, police officers and a judge. Children were buried in coffins, animals were killed and young women impregnated, according to June. The defendant further argued that the woman failed to show any brain injuries resulting from the CO2 poisoning. He offered the alternate theory that the brain injuries were the result of cult abuse.
After a six day trial, the jury deliberated for four and a-half hours before returning a $16.5 million award for the plaintiff in redress for her emotional distress.
[www.jvra.com/verdict/article/18679/PsychologistMalpractice; "A Primer on Malpractice for Psychologists", Samuel Knapp, Professional Psychology, Vol. 11 (4), August 1980; www.medicalmalpractice.com/Resources/PsychologistMalpractice; www.psychologytoday.com/ Psychology Today/ The Raving Psychologist/ July 14, 2011]
The national law offices of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors, provide capable, competent and experienced attorneys to handle psychologist malpractice or negligence claims, patient abuse allegations, and boundary violations --- all of which can have disastrous consequences on the patient.
"Above all, do no harm." (Hippocratic Oath, 400 B.C.)
$16,500,000 VERDICT: Psychology Malpractice or Negligence - Patient accuses psychologist of implanting memories of rape and abuse by satanic cult during treatment - Pain and suffering damages.
In this case, a woman sued her psychologist, and also her ex-husband who worked in the psychologist’s office, for implanting memories of abuse by a satanic cult during CO2 treatment (carbon dioxide treatment for panic attacks). The ex-husband settled. The defendant psychologist denied wrongdoing, insisting that the dangerous memories were "real" repressed ones.
The plaintiff sought treatment from the State College (Pennsylvania) office of the defendant, a licensed psychologist. The plaintiff’s husband was employed at that office at the time. For four years thereafter, the plaintiff underwent treatment including hypnosis and CO2 (carbon dioxide) therapy under the supervision of the defendant.
CO2 treatment involved having a mask placed over the plaintiff’s face while she breathed in oxygen and CO2 until unconscious. It was during the hypnosis and the CO2-induced unconsciousness that the plaintiff underwent her treatment by the doctor, in sessions lasting two to eight hours.
It was during this treatment, the plaintiff alleged, that the defendant implanted memories of satanic ritual abuse in her mind, as well as memories of sexual abuse at the hands of her family. The plaintiff began experiencing flashbacks and nightmares that the defendant asserted were "repressed memories."
After ceasing CO2 treatments for health reasons, the plaintiff began to doubt the authenticity of the flashbacks and their relationship with the treatment, and contacted the police.
The plaintiff filed suit in Center County, Pennsylvania for medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress, naming both the doctor and her ex-husband as defendants.
She sought recovery for mental anguish and other non-economic damages.
The defendant ex-husband settled with the plaintiff.
The defendant doctor’s counsel was provided by his insurer until six months prior to trial.
The defendant doctor refused to settle, dismissed the insurance attorney and represented himself pro se thereafter. The defendant also filed a $3 million against the plaintiff for defamation.
The plaintiff asserted that the defendant psychologist had a penchant for a theory of satanic cult abuse, multiple personality disorder and repressed memories. The defendant testified at trial to having had 11 prior patients who discussed under hypnosis claims similar to the plaintiff’s flashbacks. The plaintiff asserted that these "memories" were implanted by the doctor during therapy sessions. She described her treatment with the defendant, beginning with two hour "mega-sessions" of hypnosis, which in turn led to CO2 treatments, in which she breathed CO2 from a mask until losing consciousness. She underwent this treatment for three and a-half years, multiple times a day.
The plaintiff stated that she had a normal family life, asserting that the flashbacks were not genuine or recoverable memories. She further argued that she had been forced to undergo the experience of sexual assaults repeatedly during her hundreds of sessions with the doctor. She also cited the end of her marriage and alienation from her family due to the experience. Finally, the plaintiff asserted that she had suffered brain damage as a result of the extensive use of CO2.
Testifying for the plaintiff were Dr. Mary Margaret Hart, a psychologist, and Dr. Judy Zarit, a neuropsychologist, as well as the plaintiff’s treating physicians.
The defendant psychologist asserted at trial that the plaintiff had a long history of physical and emotional pain, and that she did suffer childhood abuse, including abuse based in a satanic cult in State College, Pennsylvania. The defendant called Kimberly June, a former State College therapist, who testified to having treated two separate patients for similar cult abuse in Center County.
Therapist June testified via telephone that the cult operated in the 1960s, and included doctors, police officers and a judge. Children were buried in coffins, animals were killed and young women impregnated, according to June. The defendant further argued that the woman failed to show any brain injuries resulting from the CO2 poisoning. He offered the alternate theory that the brain injuries were the result of cult abuse.
After a six day trial, the jury deliberated for four and a-half hours before returning a $16.5 million award for the plaintiff in redress for her emotional distress.
[www.jvra.com/verdict/article/18679/PsychologistMalpractice; "A Primer on Malpractice for Psychologists", Samuel Knapp, Professional Psychology, Vol. 11 (4), August 1980; www.medicalmalpractice.com/Resources/PsychologistMalpractice; www.psychologytoday.com/ Psychology Today/ The Raving Psychologist/ July 14, 2011]
"WARE WINS AWARD FOR LEGAL ADVOCACY": - Super Trial Attorney Charles Jerome Ware -
Retrieved from the archives of The Howard County Times and The Baltimore Sun, June 8, 1989, by Assistant Editor Jacqueline E. Burrell:
If Charles Ware had a personal motto, it would probably read, "Defend the Underdog" - particularly if the underdog is up against a large corporate or government entity. The Columbia-based attorney says he will "take on anybody." And he means it.
He has taken on Columbia's primary developer, The Rouse Co, filing a $28 million anti-trust lawsuit against the firm on behalf of local businessman Rob Harper. He has challenged Turf Valley Country Club owner Nicholas Mangione for racist practices and charged the Howard County Police Department with discrimination. And he is representing black Burger King franchise owners in a $500 million class action suit.
Ware is given to using dramatic courtroom techniques, even bringing stuffed animals along, baring their fangs and claws, to demonstrate the monstrosity of big corporate giants.
Ware has also flung himself into a courtroom witness stand, mimicked prosecution witnesses, and sent numerous "urgent" press releases to the news media.
["Best Attorneys and Counsellors in the United States" (2012); "Charles Hamilton Houston Award for Outstanding Legal Advocacy"; "Best Lawyers in America"].
Ware's style causes Howard County's mostly subdued legal community to raise its collective eyebrows. But that same style - and its results - has garnered him the 1989 Charles Hamilton Houston award for outstanding legal advocacy.
The award is given by the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit organization. It was established in 1980 by former Maryland Congressman Parren Mitchell to "...enhance, expand and defend minority business opportunities and growth."
Ware's flair for drama in and out of the courtroom has not affected his professional standing within the legal community. He is a respected lawyer with impressive credentials.
Born in Anniston, Ala., the 17-year Columbia resident was formerly a prosecutor for the U.S. Justice Department, chief legal counsel to the head of the Federal Trade Commission, and served as the youngest federal administrative law judge in the history of the United States.
Ware currently has a private law practice locally and is the general counsel for the Maryland chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Ware himself laughs at being called flamboyant, saying it is a misnomer, but admits that his legal style is "different from the mainstream."
He says he feels honored by the minority business group's award because the selection was made by his peers. "What has made me is not my flamboyance, but getting visible cases," he said. "I do relish going against the odds."
If Charles Ware had a personal motto, it would probably read, "Defend the Underdog" - particularly if the underdog is up against a large corporate or government entity. The Columbia-based attorney says he will "take on anybody." And he means it.
He has taken on Columbia's primary developer, The Rouse Co, filing a $28 million anti-trust lawsuit against the firm on behalf of local businessman Rob Harper. He has challenged Turf Valley Country Club owner Nicholas Mangione for racist practices and charged the Howard County Police Department with discrimination. And he is representing black Burger King franchise owners in a $500 million class action suit.
Ware is given to using dramatic courtroom techniques, even bringing stuffed animals along, baring their fangs and claws, to demonstrate the monstrosity of big corporate giants.
Ware has also flung himself into a courtroom witness stand, mimicked prosecution witnesses, and sent numerous "urgent" press releases to the news media.
["Best Attorneys and Counsellors in the United States" (2012); "Charles Hamilton Houston Award for Outstanding Legal Advocacy"; "Best Lawyers in America"].
Ware's style causes Howard County's mostly subdued legal community to raise its collective eyebrows. But that same style - and its results - has garnered him the 1989 Charles Hamilton Houston award for outstanding legal advocacy.
The award is given by the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit organization. It was established in 1980 by former Maryland Congressman Parren Mitchell to "...enhance, expand and defend minority business opportunities and growth."
Ware's flair for drama in and out of the courtroom has not affected his professional standing within the legal community. He is a respected lawyer with impressive credentials.
Born in Anniston, Ala., the 17-year Columbia resident was formerly a prosecutor for the U.S. Justice Department, chief legal counsel to the head of the Federal Trade Commission, and served as the youngest federal administrative law judge in the history of the United States.
Ware currently has a private law practice locally and is the general counsel for the Maryland chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
Ware himself laughs at being called flamboyant, saying it is a misnomer, but admits that his legal style is "different from the mainstream."
He says he feels honored by the minority business group's award because the selection was made by his peers. "What has made me is not my flamboyance, but getting visible cases," he said. "I do relish going against the odds."
Tuesday, November 13, 2012
HOWARD COUNTY MARYLAND LAW BLOG: An Update by Attorney Charles Jerome Ware
Charles Ware is a principal in the national law firm of Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Attorneys and Counsellors. The firm is headquartered in Columbia, Howard County, Maryland. The firm's motto is: "Still working. Still committed. Still here to make a difference."
It is Monday, November 12th, 2012, and the U.S. Congress is back for its "lame duck" session. There are several important pieces of legislation related to federal employees that Congress will attempt to address during this session.
Among the measures awaiting Congressional action is one affecting federal whistleblowers and a U.S. Postal Service bill that has a government-wide workers’ compensation provision.
Congress has been trying to figure out how to keep the U.S. Postal Service afloat for years. The Senate passed a bi-partisan bill in April, 2012 (S. 1789).
When the Senate acted, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) said “this legislation will change the USPS so it can stay alive throughout the 21st century to serve the people and businesses of this country.”
But the key sponsor of House legislation, Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), has called the Senate bill “wholly unacceptable,” because he said the bill does not permit postal officials to quickly close facilities in order to save money.
“Instead of finding savings to help the Postal Service survive, the Senate postal bill has devolved into a special interest spending binge that would actually make things worse,” said Issa. “While the Postal Service is actually trying to shutter some facilities it does not need, the Senate bill forces the Postal Service to keep over one hundred excess postal facilities open at a cost of $900 million per year.”
Postal employee unions were ambivalent about the Senate’s legislation, which would affect other federal workers as well. Among its many provisions, the bill would cut some workers’ compensation payments three years after enactment. Not only postal workers, but other federal employees would be covered. Compensation would not be reduced, however, for those who are totally and permanently disabled or already above retirement age.
Another bill that the 112th Congress could act on during its final days is the "Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act".
The whistleblower bill would strengthen protection against retaliation from supervisors toward federal employees who report waste, fraud or abuse. This bill has been more than a decade in the making. It was passed by the House in September, 2012.
More updates will be forthcoming.
[money.cnn.com/2012/04/27/ "Postal Service Bill Faces Roadblocks"; www.dailykos.com/2012/04/25/ "Today in Congress Senate Wraps Post Office Bill"; http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/federal-employee-bills-on-plate-of-lame-duck-congress/2012/11/12/75b68d1a-2ba4-11e2-96b6-8e6a7524553f_blog.html; Joe Davidson: federaldiary@washpost.com]
It is Monday, November 12th, 2012, and the U.S. Congress is back for its "lame duck" session. There are several important pieces of legislation related to federal employees that Congress will attempt to address during this session.
Among the measures awaiting Congressional action is one affecting federal whistleblowers and a U.S. Postal Service bill that has a government-wide workers’ compensation provision.
Congress has been trying to figure out how to keep the U.S. Postal Service afloat for years. The Senate passed a bi-partisan bill in April, 2012 (S. 1789).
When the Senate acted, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) said “this legislation will change the USPS so it can stay alive throughout the 21st century to serve the people and businesses of this country.”
But the key sponsor of House legislation, Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), has called the Senate bill “wholly unacceptable,” because he said the bill does not permit postal officials to quickly close facilities in order to save money.
“Instead of finding savings to help the Postal Service survive, the Senate postal bill has devolved into a special interest spending binge that would actually make things worse,” said Issa. “While the Postal Service is actually trying to shutter some facilities it does not need, the Senate bill forces the Postal Service to keep over one hundred excess postal facilities open at a cost of $900 million per year.”
Postal employee unions were ambivalent about the Senate’s legislation, which would affect other federal workers as well. Among its many provisions, the bill would cut some workers’ compensation payments three years after enactment. Not only postal workers, but other federal employees would be covered. Compensation would not be reduced, however, for those who are totally and permanently disabled or already above retirement age.
Another bill that the 112th Congress could act on during its final days is the "Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act".
The whistleblower bill would strengthen protection against retaliation from supervisors toward federal employees who report waste, fraud or abuse. This bill has been more than a decade in the making. It was passed by the House in September, 2012.
More updates will be forthcoming.
[money.cnn.com/2012/04/27/ "Postal Service Bill Faces Roadblocks"; www.dailykos.com/2012/04/25/ "Today in Congress Senate Wraps Post Office Bill"; http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/federal-employee-bills-on-plate-of-lame-duck-congress/2012/11/12/75b68d1a-2ba4-11e2-96b6-8e6a7524553f_blog.html; Joe Davidson: federaldiary@washpost.com]
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)